Zero trust communication system for freight shipping organizations, and methods of use

ABSTRACT

Presented herein are systems and methods of securely sharing data from multiple sources with different client terminals. A server may establish an electronic document for defining a transaction. The electronic document may have data fields. Each data field may be from a client terminal. The server may identify encryption keys to encrypt the corresponding data fields included in the electronic document. The server may distribute the encryption keys across the client terminals in accordance with an access control policy. The access control policy may specify access permissions for a client terminal to each of the plurality of data fields based on a role of the client terminal in the transaction. The server may provide, to each client terminal with access to the data fields in the electronic document via the encryption keys distributed in accordance with the access control policy.

CROSS-REFERENCE TO RELATED APPLICATIONS

The present application claims the benefit of priority under 35 U.S.C. §120 as a continuation of U.S. application Ser. No. 17/397,315, filedAug. 9, 2021, which claims the benefit of priority under 35 U.S.C. § 120as a continuation of PCT Patent Application No. PCT/US2020/019661, filedon Feb. 25, 2020, which is a continuation-in-part of U.S. applicationSer. No. 16/501,399 entitled “Zero Trust Communication System forFreight Shipping Organizations, and Methods of Use” filed on Apr. 6,2019, and claims priority from U.S. Provisional Application No.62/919,097 entitled “Encrypted Distributed Ledger for Use with FreightShipping Organizations, and methods of use” filed on Feb. 25, 2019, thecontents of each of which is incorporated herein by reference in itsentirety for all purposes.

FIELD OF THE DISCLOSURE

The present disclosure relates to systems and methods for exchangingencrypted data, including but not limited to systems and methods forexchanging encrypted data in zero trust communication environments.

BACKGROUND

The transport of goods over long distances using containers is astandard form of shipping. Intermodal containers are used to transportgoods by automobile, train and ships. The units are stackable anddesigned to be moved from one form of transport to another withoutopening the container. A shipment, which may involve the transportationof one or more containers, is the commitment of a shipping carrier todeliver the goods, either using intermodal containers or as projectcargo (collectively “cargo” or “freight”). In order to have thesuccessful fulfillment of a shipment, the sharing of relevant data amongdifferent parties involved in the shipment is required. These partiesinclude, but are not limited to the shipping carrier, the vesseloperators in the shipping process, ports/terminals, government agenciesas well as shipping parties in the shipment including the shipper, theconsignee and sometimes the forwarder and notify parties. Other partiesmay also be involved in a freight shipment.

BRIEF SUMMARY

Described herein are systems and methods for using a communicationsystem where zero trust is involved. The communication system may bedesigned to work with users that may be direct competitors with eachother, or ancillary competitors, but sometimes desire, or may berequired to work in the same space in order to achieve their businessobjectives.

Businesses involved in the loading, unloading, and movement of shippingcontainers (sometimes referred to as intermodal containers), communicateto each other using business to business (B2B) communication, ElectronicData Interchange (EDI) and application programming interface (API)calls. These communication channels are point to point with arequirement that one party communicate with one other party. Theindividual to individual nature of this communication does not generallyallow for multiple parties to be “kept in the loop” simultaneously.There are also variations in the protocol different parties adopt in howthey handle communications, so communications may be delayed or subjectto business policy timing that reduces the timeliness of suchcommunications. The geographic distribution of the parties in movingfreight contributes to the delay in communications. Freight mayoriginate in Asia and be destined for locations in the Americas, Europeor Africa. The convenient time to attempt communication for one partymay be after business hours of another, causing further delay.

Organizations that compete directly with each other, may sometimes shareresources to complete their business obligations. Such as two or moreshipping companies sharing their vessels in which to transport goodssuch that better service coverage as well as economies of scale can beachieved. Another example is where multiple shippers using the sameforwarder may share a single intermodal container to avoid each havingto pay for and ship separate, partially full intermodal containers.Other economies and better service fulfillment are realized when thecompanies can coordinate their activities. However, coordination oftenrequires disclosing confidential data, which companies are not prone todo. There are also regulatory requirements prohibiting the sharing ofcertain kinds of data with certain parties. More generally, each partyhas confidential information. The need to protect confidentialinformation, such as business contacts, customer lists, pricinginformation, and so on, is critical to maintaining a competitiveadvantage, and regulatory compliance, in the market place. Thus partieswho compete with one another, or are required to use each other'sservices, will not share their confidential information.

Approaches dealing with intermodal containers and tracking theirlocation tend to focus on the contents of the containers, or tracking insmall locations, rather than in a global sense. Thus there remains aneed for a communication and data control system that allows parties whowork together toward a common task to share confidential information ina format that allows the various parties to see only the informationthey need to see to do their portion of the task, while keeping anyother information confidential to the source (of the information). Thereis further a need for a system that can reduce the time required for thetracking of freight anywhere in the path of the shipping process, andprovide timely updates of location for both intermodal containers andproject cargo.

There is further a need to provide various parties associated with thetransportation, delivery loading and unloading of intermodal containersand project cargo with a timely status and shipment updates of theseshipments while simultaneously protecting data privacy and businessconfidentiality. These and other objectives may be met by the followingdisclosure.

A system is described for generating a shipping document. The system mayhave a shipping document control hub, and one or more user nodes. Theshipping document control hub may have a computer with a logic, a memoryand a communication device. The hub also may have a message broker ableto send and receive event messages. There may be an access policyrepository storing global member list, list of access policy documentsand list of role lists. There may also be a public key repository storedon the memory. There may also be an identify (ID) repository having alist of one or more users, one or more user login credentials, and oneor more user parameters. There may also be a blockchain database thatincludes one or more blockchain nodes storing encrypted shippingdocuments, encrypted data encryption keys and the document originator'ssignature. The user nodes may have one or more of a computer, a messagebroker, a key store for decrypting shipping documents, an API interfacewith a cryptographic layer for encrypting shipping documents, and aportal for accessing the shipping document control hub. The APIinterface may be executed on the logic of the user computer andcommunicates with the shipping document control hub message broker.

There is also described a standalone user node for use in generating asingle, shared shipping document transaction. The user node may have acomputer with a logic for executing program instructions, a memorydevice, a user interface and a communication device for accessing ashipping document control hub. The user node may have a message brokerable to send and receive event messages. An API interface may have acryptographic access layer, the API may interface coordinating theshared shipping document transaction correspondence to the shippingdocument control hub. The user node may also have a blockchain databasestored on the memory device. The memory device may be local, remote,cloud based, or removable. The blockchain database may have shippingdocuments relevant to the user role in the single, shared shippingdocument transaction.

There is also described a standalone shipping document control hub foruse in coordinating communication between a first user node and seconduser node in the distribution of a shared shipping (electronic)document. The shared shipping document may have encrypted dataattributes, encrypted data encryption keys and/or a documentoriginator's digital signature. The shipping document control hub mayuse a computer with a logic for executing program instructions, a memorydevice and a communication device for communicating with the user nodes.There may be a communication routing controller, the controller may usea routing logic to route a shared shipping document received from thefirst user node to the second user node. The second user node may be oneof the shipment parties of the shipping document provided by the firstuser node. There may be a distributed ledger stored on the memory. Thedistributed ledger may be a blockchain database for storing encryptedshared shipping documents (or select data attributes of a sharedshipping document). There may also be stored encrypted data encryptionkeys and a hash of the encrypted shared shipping document, and adocument originator's digital signature for the shared shippingdocument.

There is also a method of generating a shared shipping document. Themethod may involve; generating a shared shipping document and encryptingit by the cryptographic access layer in the API interface, submittingthe encrypted shared shipping document, the encrypted data encryptionkeys and the document originator's digital signature to a shippingdocument control hub (hub), identifying one or more users, and each usermay have at least one assigned role according to an access controlpolicy; forwarding the encrypted shared shipping document, the encrypteddata encryption keys and the document originator's digital signature tothe one or more users, wherein the one or more users may fulfill a roleof the encrypted shipping document based on the one or more userassigned roles as provided by the access control policy.

There may also be a method for identifying user access rights to theshared shipping document. The method may involve receiving a shippingdocument to be shared to at least one user, the document having anoriginator, a role list and an identification code. Then identifying theoriginator, determining the role of the originator based on a globaluser list (or global member list), verifying the role list of the sharedshipping document, encrypting at least one data attribute of the sharedshipping document by data encryption keys, encrypting the dataencryption keys by public keys of related shipment parties according tothe access policy, and distributing that at least one data attribute toat least one verified user.

Additional aspects are also described.

The freight tracking systems and methods described herein may helpcompanies and individuals track the progress of freight containers, suchas intermodal containers, through the shipping processes. This may beachieved by assigning each party a role as the various parties provideshipping documents to the system. The system may organize the shippingdocuments and encrypt the shipping documents according to a logicalscheme. The shipping documents may go through a process where theencrypted shipping documents may be shared with other parties logicallyrelated to one another, e.g. as when they are all involved with a commoncarrier or agent. The data corresponding to the freight being shipped,may updated at various times and events during the transit of thefreight from the point of origin to the point of destination. Eachupdate generates new encrypted shipping documents, which may be sharedwith all parties sharing a logical, business or financial relationship.

The shipping document representing the freight may contain informationabout the freight shipment, such as what kind of product may be shipped,how much it weighs, and whether it requires any special handling, toname only a few. The shipping document may also include informationabout the parties involved (e.g. the shipper, the consignee, theshipping carrier), and routing information of the shipment. In addition,the shipping document may include one or more event records which storethings that happen to the shipment that may be of significance to itsstatus. Overall, the shipping document may cover a variety of otherdetails that may be relevant to any shipment. The access policy of theshipping document may also contain information about who may take ashipping role. A shipping document may be added, edited or read in thesystem. In some embodiments, the shipping document may containinformation about a user. In some embodiments, the shipping document maybe a virtual document of a freight shipment. In some embodiments theshipping document may contain information about a subscriber.

In some embodiments, the parties accessing the system may be users ofthe system. These users may have various levels of access to, andprivileges over, the system. In some embodiments the users may be ableto read data presented in the system. In some embodiments users may beable to create data in the system. In still some embodiments, users maybe able to update existing information in the system. In someembodiments, users may be able to do one or more of: create, read andupdate the data in the system.

In some embodiments, there may be one or more level of membership in thesystem. These differing levels of membership may come with differentaccess rights or authorities. In some embodiments, the different accessrights may come with different fees.

In some embodiments, there may be a system that receives userinformation, and stores information related to the shipment and trackingof containers in real time. The system may include a computer having aprocessor, a memory device and a communication interface for accessingthe internet. The computer system may receive, via the communicationinterface, data from one or more users. The data may be processed andcollected and sorted into an organized data structure in the memorydevice. The computer may have a logic enabling the computer to transformthe data from one or more users into an encrypted record. The computermay use a variety of encryption methodologies to encrypt the data toproduce the encrypted shipping document. A series of data encryptionkeys may also be produced, with one data encryption key being providedto each attribute in the shipping document. The relevant individual dataencryption keys based on the role of the users of the related shipmentparties may be encrypted by the public key of the user. The public keyof the user is called the key encryption key. These encrypted dataencryption keys and the encrypted data package may be provided to theusers through blockchain nodes made available by the system to eachuser. Nodes may be shared or dedicated to a shipment party. A user maydecrypt encrypted data encryption keys using a private key, and then usethe decrypted encryption keys to decrypt the relevant data in the node.

In some embodiments, there may be a method of securing data privacy fora shipping document shared in a distributed user group. The methodcomprises receiving, via a communication network, the shipping documentfrom a user, the user may have an assigned role, wherein the shippingdocument comprises a plurality of data attributes. There may also beencrypting, via a first encryption logic, the plurality of dataattributes into a like number of encrypted data attributes, the firstencryption logic generating a data encryption key corresponding to eachencrypted data attribute. The method may also involve organizing, via aprogramming logic, the plurality of encrypted data attributes into adistributed data ledger, the distributed data ledger containing at leastone encrypted shipping document from a user. The method further involvesencrypting, via a second encryption logic, the encryption keyscorresponding to the plurality of data attributes, the second encryptionlogic may use a look up table providing permissions for one or moreusers of the distributed data ledger based on the user's assigned role.The method may also have distributing, via the communication network,the encrypted data attributes, the encrypted data encryption key to theblockchain nodes in a more efficient manner so that the entire solutionmay be scalable. Each user may have access to a node, the node mayprovide access to one of the distributed data ledgers. Each user mayonly decrypt data related to their assigned role.

The first and second encryption may utilize a variety of encryptiontechnologies. The user assigned role may associated with a user accesscontrol policy.

The use of the system and/or methods may provide a combination ofcontext sensitive data segregation, encryption and access control policyto achieve data privacy for a distributed ledger technology.

At least one aspect of the present disclosure is directed to a method ofsecurely sharing data from multiple sources with different clientterminals. At least one server having one or more processors mayestablish an electronic document for defining a single transaction. Theelectronic document may have a plurality of data fields. Each of theplurality of data fields may be associated with one of a plurality ofclient terminals. The at least one server may identify a plurality ofencryption keys to encrypt the corresponding plurality of data fieldsincluded in the electronic document. The at least one server maydistribute the plurality of encryption keys across the plurality ofclient terminals in accordance with an access control policy. The accesscontrol policy may specify access permissions for a corresponding clientterminal of the plurality of client terminals to each of the pluralityof data fields based on a role of the corresponding client terminal inthe single transaction. The at least one server may provide, to each ofthe plurality of client terminals with access to at least one of theplurality of data fields in the electronic document via the plurality ofencryption keys distributed in accordance with the access controlpolicy.

In some embodiments, establishing the electronic document may includereceiving, from a first client terminal of the plurality of clientterminals, a request to update an attribute of a first data field of theplurality of the data fields in the electronic document. In someembodiments, establishing the electronic document may includedetermining, in accordance with the access control policy based on arole of the first client terminal in the single transaction, that thefirst client terminal has permission to modify the first data field. Insome embodiments, establishing the electronic document may includepermitting, responsive to determining that the first client terminal hasthe permission, the client terminal to update the attribute of the firstdata field in the electronic document.

In some embodiments, the at least one server may identify, responsive toreceiving a request from a first client terminal of the plurality ofclient terminals to update an attribute in a first data field of theplurality of the data fields in the electronic document, a role of thefirst client terminal from a list of roles in the single transaction. Insome embodiments, the at least one server may determine, in accordancewith the access control policy based on the identified role of the firstclient terminal, that the first client terminal lacks permission tomodify the first data field. In some embodiments, the at least oneserver may prevent, responsive to determining that the first clientterminal lacks the permission, updating of the attribute of the datafield in the electronic document by the first client terminal.

In some embodiments, identifying the plurality of encryption keys mayinclude identifying, for the corresponding plurality of clientterminals, a plurality of private encryption keys and a plurality ofpublic encryption keys. In some embodiments, distributing the pluralityof encryption keys may include providing a private encryption key of theplurality of private encryption keys to a corresponding client terminalof the plurality of client terminals. In some embodiments, distributingthe plurality of encryption keys may include providing a publicencryption key of the plurality of public encryption keys to at leastone of the plurality of client terminals in accordance with the accesscontrol policy. At least one of the plurality of data fields in theelectronic document may be accessible by at least two of the pluralityof client terminals using at least one of the private encryption key andthe public encryption key.

In some embodiments, the at least one server may identify, from theplurality of client terminals, a first client terminal and a secondclient terminal based on a first role of the first client terminal and asecond role of the second client terminal in accordance with the accesscontrol policy. In some embodiments, the at least one server mayencrypt, responsive to identifying the first client terminal and thesecond client terminal, a first encryption key of the first clientterminal using a public encryption key of the second client terminal. Insome embodiments, distributing the plurality of encryption keys mayinclude providing, to the second client terminal the first encryptionkey of the first client terminal encrypted with the public encryptionkey of the second client terminal.

In some embodiments, the at least one server may identify a plurality ofhash values derived from a corresponding plurality of attributes in theplurality of data fields of the electronic document. Each hash value ofthe plurality of hash values may ensure data integrity of one of theplurality of attributes. In some embodiments, the at least one servermay generate, for a first client terminal of the plurality of clientterminals, a first signature using a first hash value of the pluralityof hash values and a first encryption key of the plurality of encryptionkeys. The first hash value may be derived from a first attribute of theplurality of attributes. The first encryption key may be for a firstdata field of the plurality of data fields corresponding to the firstattribute. The first signature may ensure data integrity of the firstattribute and the first data field.

In some embodiments, the at least one server may identify, from theplurality of client terminals in accordance with the access controlpolicy, a first client terminal and a second client terminal based on afirst role of the first client terminal and a second role of the secondclient terminal. In some embodiments, providing access may includeproviding, to the second client terminal, access to a data field of theplurality of data fields of the first client terminal via a hash valuederived from an attribute of the data field and a signature of the firstclient terminal. The second client terminal may obtain an encryption keyof the plurality of encryption keys of the first client terminal usingthe hash value and the signature.

In some embodiments, the at least one server may determine whether adistribution of the plurality of encryption keys across the plurality ofclient terminals is successful. In some embodiments, the at least oneserver may provide, based on a determination of whether the distributionof the plurality of encryption keys is successful, an event notificationto at least one of the plurality of client terminals.

In some embodiments, identifying the plurality of encryption keys mayinclude aggregating, from each client terminal of the plurality ofclient terminals, a corresponding encryption key for the plurality ofencryption keys. The corresponding encryption key may be generated bythe client terminal to encrypt a data field of the plurality of datafields. In some embodiments, establishing the electronic document mayinclude establishing the electronic document on a database of a shippingdocument control hub to coordinate communications among the plurality ofclient terminals, the plurality of data fields of the electronicdocument corresponding to a corresponding plurality of database entrieson the database.

In some embodiments, the single transaction may involve a physical goodand may include a series of sub-transactions of the physical good. Eachof the plurality of data fields may be mapped to one of thesub-transactions. In some embodiments, each of the sub-transactions ofthe physical good may be handled by at least one service provider.

At least one aspect of the present disclosure is directed to a systemfor securely sharing data from multiple sources with different clientterminals. The system may include at least one server having one or moreprocessors. The at least one server may establish an electronic documentfor defining a single transaction. The electronic document may have aplurality of data fields. Each of the plurality of data fields may beassociated with one of a plurality of client terminals. The at least oneserver may identify a plurality of encryption keys to encrypt thecorresponding plurality of data fields included in the electronicdocument. The at least one server may distribute the plurality ofencryption keys across the plurality of client terminals in accordancewith an access control policy. The access control policy may specifyaccess permissions for a corresponding client terminal of the pluralityof client terminals to each of the plurality of data fields based on arole of the corresponding client terminal in the single transaction. Theat least one server may provide, to each of the plurality of clientterminals with access to at least one of the plurality of data fields inthe electronic document via the plurality of encryption keys distributedin accordance with the access control policy.

In some embodiments, the at least one server may receive, from a firstclient terminal of the plurality of client terminals, a request toupdate an attribute of a first data field of the plurality of the datafields in the electronic document. In some embodiments, the at least oneserver may determine, in accordance with the access control policy basedon a role of the first client terminal in the single transaction, thatthe first client terminal has permission to modify the first data field.In some embodiments, the at least one server may permit, responsive todetermining that the first client terminal has the permission, theclient terminal to update the attribute of the first data field in theelectronic document.

In some embodiments, the at least one server may identify, responsive toreceiving a request from a first client terminal of the plurality ofclient terminals to update an attribute in a first data field of theplurality of the data fields in the electronic document, a role of thefirst client terminal from a list of roles in the single transaction. Insome embodiments, the at least one server may determine, in accordancewith the access control policy based on the identified role of the firstclient terminal, that the first client terminal lacks permission tomodify the first data field. In some embodiments, the at least oneserver may prevent, responsive to determining that the first clientterminal lacks the permission, updating of the attribute of the datafield in the electronic document by the first client terminal.

In some embodiments, the at least one server may identify, for thecorresponding plurality of client terminals, a plurality of privateencryption keys and a plurality of public encryption keys. In someembodiments, the at least one server may provide a private encryptionkey of the plurality of private encryption keys to a correspondingclient terminal of the plurality of client terminals. In someembodiments, the at least one server may provide a public encryption keyof the plurality of public encryption keys to at least one of theplurality of client terminals in accordance with the access controlpolicy. At least one of the plurality of data fields in the electronicdocument may be accessible by at least two of the plurality of clientterminals using at least one of the private encryption key and thepublic encryption key.

In some embodiments, the at least one server may identify, from theplurality of client terminals, a first client terminal and a secondclient terminal based on a first role of the first client terminal and asecond role of the second client terminal in accordance with the accesscontrol policy. In some embodiments, the at least one server mayencrypt, responsive to identifying the first client terminal and thesecond client terminal, a first encryption key of the first clientterminal using a public encryption key of the second client terminal. Insome embodiments, the at least one server may provide, to the secondclient terminal the first encryption key of the first client terminalencrypted with the public encryption key of the second client terminal.

In some embodiments, the at least one server may identify a plurality ofhash values derived from a corresponding plurality of attributes in theplurality of data fields of the electronic document. Each hash value ofthe plurality of hash values may ensure data integrity of one of theplurality of attributes. In some embodiments, the at least one servermay generate, for a first client terminal of the plurality of clientterminals, a first signature using a first hash value of the pluralityof hash values and a first encryption key of the plurality of encryptionkeys. The first hash value may be derived from a first attribute of theplurality of attributes. The first encryption key may be for a firstdata field of the plurality of data fields corresponding to the firstattribute. The first signature may ensure data integrity of the firstattribute and the first data field.

In some embodiments, the at least one server may identify, from theplurality of client terminals in accordance with the access controlpolicy, a first client terminal and a second client terminal based on afirst role of the first client terminal and a second role of the secondclient terminal. In some embodiments, the at least one server mayprovide access, to the second client terminal, access to a data field ofthe plurality of data fields of the first client terminal via a hashvalue derived from an attribute of the data field and a signature of thefirst client terminal. The second client terminal may obtain anencryption key of the plurality of encryption keys of the first clientterminal using the hash value and the signature.

In some embodiments, the at least one server may determine whether adistribution of the plurality of encryption keys across the plurality ofclient terminals is successful. In some embodiments, the at least oneserver may provide, based on a determination of whether the distributionof the plurality of encryption keys is successful, an event notificationto at least one of the plurality of client terminals.

In some embodiments, the at least one server may aggregate, from eachclient terminal of the plurality of client terminals, a correspondingencryption key for the plurality of encryption keys. The correspondingencryption key may be generated by the client terminal to encrypt a datafield of the plurality of data fields. In some embodiments, the at leastone server may establish the electronic document on a database of ashipping document control hub to coordinate communications among theplurality of client terminals, the plurality of data fields of theelectronic document corresponding to a corresponding plurality ofdatabase entries on the database.

In some embodiments, the single transaction may involve a physical goodand may include a series of sub-transactions of the physical good. Eachof the plurality of data fields may be mapped to one of thesub-transactions. In some embodiments, each of the sub-transactions ofthe physical good may be handled by at least one service provider (e.g.,shipper, carrier, vessel operator, terminal operator). A serviceprovider may also be referred to as a facilitator or transactionmember/user.

Alternative embodiments of the system and method may be apparent tothose skilled in the art upon study of the present disclosure. Thesealternative embodiments are intended as equivalents for purposes of theclaims appended herein.

BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE SEVERAL VIEWS OF THE DRAWINGS

To easily identify the discussion of any particular element or act, themost significant digit or digits in a reference number refer to thefigure number in which that element is first introduced.

FIG. 1 illustrates a communication system.

FIG. 2 illustrates an example shipment route 200 in accordance with anembodiment.

FIG. 3 illustrates a key vault process 300 in accordance with anembodiment.

FIG. 4 illustrates an asymmetric key location 400 in accordance with anembodiment.

FIG. 5 illustrates an authentication process 500 in accordance with anembodiment.

FIG. 6 illustrates an API interface 600 in accordance with anembodiment.

FIG. 7 illustrates an API management process 700 in accordance with anembodiment.

FIG. 8 illustrates a shipping document data distribution 800 inaccordance with an embodiment.

FIG. 9 illustrates a shipping document creation model 900 in accordancewith an embodiment.

FIG. 10 illustrates a sample list of bookings 1000 in accordance with anembodiment.

FIG. 11 illustrates a retrieve shipping document 1100 in accordance withan embodiment.

FIG. 12 illustrates a create shipping document 1200 in accordance withan embodiment.

FIG. 13 illustrates an example system 1300 in accordance with oneembodiment.

FIG. 14 illustrates an example access policy 1400 in accordance with oneembodiment.

FIG. 15 illustrates a generating keys and matching those keys to auser's assigned role and access policy 1500 in accordance with oneembodiment.

FIG. 16 illustrates a process for encrypting data attributes based onroles and access control policies 1600 in accordance with oneembodiment.

FIG. 17 illustrates a component relations example 1700 in accordancewith one embodiment.

FIG. 18 illustrates an example role list and access control policy 1800in accordance with one embodiment.

FIG. 19 illustrates an example shipping document and access controlpolicy 1900 in accordance with one embodiment.

FIG. 20 illustrates an example shipping document policy 2000 inaccordance with one embodiment.

FIG. 21 illustrates a system layout (logical) 2100 in accordance withone embodiment.

FIG. 22 illustrates a Detail Flow of role list submission 2200 inaccordance with one embodiment.

FIG. 23 illustrates a Detail flow on role list read 2300 in accordancewith one embodiment.

FIG. 24 illustrates a shipping document creation 2400 in accordance withone embodiment.

FIG. 25 illustrates a shipping document update 2500 in accordance withone embodiment.

FIG. 26 illustrates a shipping document read 2600 in accordance with oneembodiment.

FIG. 27 illustrates a booking arrangement 2700 in accordance with anembodiment.

FIG. 28 illustrates a partial booking view 2800 in accordance with anembodiment.

FIG. 29 illustrates a possible activity with a 3^(rd) party non-user2900 in accordance with an embodiment.

FIG. 30 illustrates a user providing information from the system to a3^(rd) party in accordance with an embodiment.

FIG. 31 illustrates a possible loan application process in accordancewith an embodiment.

FIG. 32 illustrates the exchange of documentation to supportestablishing a loan account in accordance with an embodiment.

FIG. 33 illustrates the exchange of documentation to support applyingfor financing in accordance with an embodiment.

FIG. 34 illustrates an example invoice in accordance with an embodiment.

FIG. 35 illustrates an example payment option in accordance with anembodiment.

FIG. 36 is a flow diagram of a method of securely sharing data frommultiple sources with different client terminals in accordance with anembodiment.

FIG. 37 is a block diagram of embodiments of a computing device.

DETAILED DESCRIPTION

The sharing of data to multiple parties may create synergy andefficiency. However, data sharing may be a problem when the data neededor utilized to conduct a single transaction (e.g., multi-stagetransaction, multi-party transaction, a series/sequence ofsub-transactions) could be confidential to one or more of the partiesinvolved in the single transaction. This problem may be particularlyacute in the area of shipping freight. Other businesses may also havethis problem. A potential solution may be a system and process toutilize encryption technologies to protect data privacy while allowingthe sharing of relevant data to the appropriate parties in a distributedledger system, as described herein. The system and methods described maybe useful in the shipping of cargo and freight. The system and methodsdescribed herein may also have applications in other industries.

The freight tracking systems and methods described herein may helpcompanies and individuals track the progress of freight through theshipping processes. This may be achieved by having various users provideshipping documents to the system. The system may contain a look up tablethat provides a listing of the roles, and rights of each role. When auser submits a shipping document to the system, the shipping documentmay contain the user's identification, and a list of roles forindividual shipment parties. The system may correlate the listed role(s)of the user from the shipping document, against the rights of therole(s) in a look up table. The system may process the shipping documentso the user and the related shipment parties may be able to access thedata after the data is encrypted. Each user in the system may have oneor more defined roles. The access to each data attribute in a shippingdocument may be defined by the role of the user. A user may only accessdata relevant to them according to the role of the user in the accesscontrol policy.

The system may recognize a shipping document submitted by a user and mayencrypt each data attribute of the shipping document. The firstencryption process may create an individual encryption key for each dataattribute.

As an example, a shipping document may have five headers and five dataattributes. The first encryption process may encrypt the five dataattributes, but not the five header fields. The distributed ledger mayalso have header fields corresponding to at least one of each encrypteddata attribute. The header fields of the distributed ledger correspondto at least one of the header fields of the shipping document. In someembodiments, the header fields of the distributed ledger correspond on aone-to-one basis with the header fields of the shipping document. Thedistributed ledger header fields may not be encrypted, but thecorresponding data attributes to each header field of the distributedledger may be encrypted. A second level of encryption may be used toencrypt each of the encryption keys in the data attributes of thedistributed ledger. The second level of encryption may be done by usingpublic keys of one or more users with known roles in the shippingprocess. The second encryption process may identify the role of the userin the shipment by correlating the user role from the shipping documentwith the look up table. Then the public keys for the users may be usedto encrypt the encryption keys corresponding to the data attributesrelevant to the users based on the users assigned role and the accesspolicy. The various attributes (encrypted data attributes, encryptedencryption keys based on the different roles, hash (generated by theencrypted data attributes) and the document originator's signature) maybe placed into a permissioned based blockchain distributed ledgerblockchain nodes. Some users may have their own blockchain nodes. Toimprove the scalability and performance when using the blockchaindistributed ledger, the data may be placed into nodes that belong to theusers involved in the shipment.

Each user in the system may have one or more assigned roles. Eachshipping document role list may identify the role of the user whosubmitted the shipping document role list and the shipping document rolelist may identify the role of the users who may be involved in theshipment. In some embodiments, the role list may track who created it, alist of the users' roles and the corresponding users, and a locator key(the identity of the creator and the booking number for the shippingdocument).

The various embodiments described herein may be used with all types ofshipping documents. A common shipping document is a “booking”—aprecursor document to creating a bill of lading. Although many shippingdocuments may be used with the present system, many examples may use theterm “booking” or “booking data.” These terms should be considered thesame as any shipping document, or shipping document data respectively.

In some embodiments, there may be a relation between various users thatallow them to see each other's data attributes. In some embodimentsthere may be business relations built into the look up table thatpermits one user to see data that is not part of their own business. Thelook up table of access rights may be derived through each partyidentifying the rights they require, as well as rights they desire, withthe system controller being the ultimate arbitrator of the rights eachuser has.

In some embodiments, the distributed ledger may represent a singleshipping document. In some embodiments there may be multiple shippingdocuments incorporated into a single distributed ledger.

In some embodiments, asymmetric cryptography may be used as part or allthe encryption methodologies described herein.

Overview Diagram of the Overall Process in Certain Approaches

The process for tracking the state of a shipment in freight channels isshown in FIG. 1 . The shaded ovals show various parties in a singleshipping transaction, and how they communicate with one another usingEDI (Electronic Data Interchange). Examples of parties are shown as ashipper, forwarder, carrier, terminal, customs, port authority andconsignee.

Brief Description of Parties

Shipper—the company or person who ships cargo to the consignee.

Consignee—the person or firm named in a freight contract to whom goodshave been shipped or turned over for care.

Forwarder (or Freight forwarder)—a person or business engaged in thebusiness of assembling, collection, consolidating, shipping anddistributing less-than-carload or less-than-truckload freight. Also aperson acting as agent in the transshipping of freight through customsincluding full preparation of documents, arranging for shipping,warehousing, delivery and export clearance.

Carrier—an individual or legal entity that is in the business oftransporting passengers or goods for hire.

Vessel Operator—any business unit which is responsible for the operatingcosts, repairs and earnings of vessels. The operator may or may not bethe owner of the vessel. Costs include crew wages, port charges and hullinsurance. Ocean carriers share the use of vessels through alliance orvessel sharing agreement and a vessel owner by a carrier (the vesseloperator) may carry the shipments booked through other carriers.

Terminal Operator—marine terminal operators (MTOs) provide wharfage,dock, warehouse, or other marine terminal facilities to ocean commoncarriers moving cargo in the ocean-borne foreign commerce.

In addition to these parties of a freight shipment, there may be otherparties interested in a freight shipment, such as government agencies(customs, inspections), financial institutions, insurance companies, andso on.

A shipper 102 may generate a shipment of product and provide informationto other parties through direct communication. These are one waycommunications from the Shipper 102 to each of the Forwarder 104,Carrier 106, Terminal 108, Customs 110, Port Authority 112, Consignee114, and if needed, a Financial Institution 116 such as a bank, lender,insurance company, bond holder, etc. As can be seen in FIG. 1 , eachcommunication with the other party is a one way communication with eachparty essentially sending the other party some information relevant to ashipment, and then the receiving party sending the original party aresponse. Each party in the process may have developed their ownproprietary technology for this form of communication. The communicationprotocols are not integrated to work together, so each receiving partyis to receive a message, and then respond in their own protocol and waitfor the other party to respond. This process is inefficient and timeconsuming.

The various parties in a shipment contract may be assigned one or moreroles in the shipment. Various roles are shown in FIG. 2 . The positionof each assigned role is marked by a different shade in the figure. FIG.2 is merely illustrative. Many other role positions are possible andexist in actual transactions. The system of creating a booking andshipping freight around the world can be seen in the illustration 200shown in FIG. 2 . In some embodiments, a shipper 202 may start ashipment booking by determining that goods are to be picked up and sentto a particular destination. The shipper 202 can create a bookingrequest (a preliminary step to forming a commercial contract to sendfreight), and designate a port authority 204 having terminals A, B and Cas shown. The shipper may also select a ship or vessel to carry thecargo by a vessel operator 206. The shipper 202 may also designate afinal consignee 208 for the shipment. The route a shipment may take isalso illustrated in FIG. 2 by way of example. If the path is followedfrom the start (Place of Receipt) to the end (Final Destination), it canbe seen that numerous parties are involved. The transportation of goodsover this route may involve many parties, all with their own mode ofcommunication, as previously described.

The above example does not show all the parties that may be involved ina shipment. Whenever freight enters a port, a port authority 204 mayhave several agencies working under their jurisdiction. There may beinspectors of various kinds (e.g., for food stuffs, live stock, fruitsand vegetables), checks against unauthorized dangerous goods, ITCinspections to certify against any sanctioned materials, immigrationinspectors and so on. Terminal operators may belong to a private companyand have terminal facilities in several other ports under theirauthority. In some cases, a party may belong to a larger company, wherethe company has to communicate up or down the chain of subsidiaries of aparent organization.

Described herein are various embodiments of a system and method ofcreating a new type of booking contract (a type of shipping document)that allows the relevant parties of the agreement to follow the progressof the freight by checking with a single point of contact. The singlepoint of contact provides up-to-date information that may be availableto all relevant parties and bypasses the restrictive communications ofhaving each party communicate to each other party, one at a time, or ina sequential fashion. The various users may be continually updated ascargo moves through the various stages of transport. These updates mayinclude the status of the cargo, financial obligations, regulatorymatters and other issues.

As used herein, the term “user” may refer to an individual ororganization. A user may be any person, party, organization or programthat may access the system and interact with the processes describedherein. Any individual or entity that may access the system as describedherein may be considered a user. The disclosure also makes use of liststhat detail certain rights, privileges and responsibilities of varioususers. Generally, a user may represent a role in a transaction, thoughit is not necessary that each user be a party to the transaction. Theterms “user” and “party” may be used herein interchangeably, unlesscontext clearly indicates otherwise.

In some embodiments, a user may get onboarded to the system and then mayobtain key vault access and various assigned keys. The user may initiatea key vault process 300 (FIG. 3 ), an initial login or start 302 to thesystem. The user onboards to the system and the system may login to akey store, and have the key store generate a key vault 304 for the user.A global user list (or global member list) for the system may record theuser's basic information. The basic information may include the user'sname, user's role in any booking, contact information, and otherinformation relevant to the role the user has. The system may store themapping of the user key vault in a key vault mapping database 306. Thenthe user may login to the system to generate public and private keys.Private keys may be stored in the user's private key vault 308. Thesystem may get the public key from the key vault, and store the publickey in a public key repository 310. Once the two keys are secured intheir respective databases, the process may end 312. In someembodiments, users may have pre-arranged access to a key vault and use apre-existing key vault in conjunction with the system as describedherein.

In some embodiments, a party may track one or more keys at a time. Thekey location 400 (FIG. 4 ) may be used so a party may have access to useits own private key 404 while the system may use the party's public key402. Each user may have a key vault with a private key 404 and a publickey 402. The public key may be stored in the system service providernetwork. The system may encrypt a data encryption key by using thepublic key of the user organization. This encryption may occur in thesystem service provider network. When the system decrypts the encrypteddata encryption key (DEK), the system sends encrypted DEK to the keystore network over a secure network connection 410. The key store maythen use the user's private key 404 to decrypt the encrypted DEK 406 toproduce a decrypted DEK in the key store network. The key store may thensend the decrypted DEK 408 back to the system, again over a securenetwork connection 412. The user may use the DEK 408 to decrypt theencrypted data related to that particular key.

In some embodiments, each data attribute encryption key may be encryptedusing a separate public key, or a separate encryption protocol, butusing the same public key to encrypt the data encryption key. Where aparticular user may have a role that permits that user to see multipledata attributes in each booking record, the above process may berepeated for each field the user has access too. The use of thisencryption and decryption procedure occurs in the communication betweenthe various systems, and may not visible to the persons accessing thedatabase information.

In some embodiments, a user may gain access to the system through anauthentication process 500 (FIG. 5 ). The user may access a clientapplication 502 by providing its login name and password. The clientapplication 502 may provide the authorized user with the organizationcredentials and may send the login request through a secure networkconnection 504 to an authorization token generator 506. The clientapplication 502 may provide the authentication information (e.g. theuser name and password as well as any other authentication information).For example, the authentication information may be an API subscriptionID and secret (e.g., password). The authorization token generator mayreceive the API subscription ID and secret from the client applicationand verify the information against the API subscription database. Oncethese items may be authenticated, the token generator 506 may generate atoken that may be returned to the user. The user's client application502 may then use the token to communicate with the booking API 508through the secure network connection 504. The user may gain access tothe booking API 508 to input and/or access data.

In some embodiments, the client application 502 may be a web basedportal and part of the authorization token generator 506 or the bookingAPI 508. In some embodiments, the client application 502 may be theclient's own software, and the authorization token generator 506 andbooking API 508 may be adapted to communicate with the client software.In some embodiments the authorization token generator 506 and bookingAPI 508 may be the same application (not shown). In some embodiments,the authorization token may have a predetermined time limit on how longthe client application may access the booking API 508 or the clientapplication 502 may have to authenticate itself to the authorizationtoken generator 506 at every session. In some embodiments, apredetermined amount of time may be set as a “timed out” securityprotocol, to automatically log out a user after a set time ofinactivity.

In some embodiments, there may be three domains of the API managementprocess, as shown in FIG. 6 . In some embodiments, the handshaking ofthe API interface 600 is shown. The API interface 600 may use the clientapplication 602, the API management tool 604 and a blockchain API 606. Aclient application 602 may be an application created by the client(user) or an application created specifically for working with the APImanagement tool 604. The user may login to the client application 602and may submit a request (e.g., create a booking request), the clientapplication 602 may send a verification request 608, which in someembodiments, may include API subscription ID and a secret, to the APImanagement tool 604. The verification request 608 may produce either asubscriber authentication 616 result, or an error (not shown). If thesubscriber authentication 616 is the result, the API management tool 604may then produce an access token and return the token 610 to the clientapplication 602. The client application 602 may then send the accesstoken and booking request payload 612 to the API management tool 604.When the API management tool 604 receives the token and payload 612request, the API management tool 604 may provide token authentication618. Then the token may be authenticated, the token may be resolved tothe organization ID based on mapping of the token and the organization.The organization ID and the payload request may then be sent 614 to theblockchain API 606 for writing to the blockchain nodes.

The example embodiment shown in FIG. 6 , has three domains. The clientapplication 602 may exist in the client application network. The APImanagement tool 604 may reside in the API management tool network, andthe blockchain API 606 may reside in the system service providernetwork. However, in some embodiments, the API Management tool networkand the system service provider network may be merged into a singlesystem network. In still other embodiments, more than 3 domains may beused.

In some embodiments, there may be an API management process 700 as shownin FIG. 7 . The API management process 700 may provide a user withaccess to the system of the present disclosure, and authenticate theuser to the system on login. A user may begin at start block 702, wherethe user may access the system through an API management process 700which authenticates a user as described herein. The subscription ID maybe assigned to the user by the system, or the user may select asubscription ID (e.g., from a drop down menu, or a set of systemoptions) and the system records it. The subscription ID may be based ona subscription fee based on a monetary payment, a bartered exchange, orit may be free. Subscription IDs may be issued to regulatory agencies,paying customers, system administrators or any other party requiringaccess to the systems described herein. Each user may also have a secretthat may be issued to the system with the login request, or with eachcommunication with the system. Once the user establishes the secret withthe system, the secret may be stored in the API management process 700,or a database that the API management process 700 may access as neededto check the user secret. Additional steps may be taken, or alternativesteps may be substituted for the subscription ID and secret challenge sothat any form of acceptable security for authentication of a user may beused.

The system may check the authentication credentials against its owncriteria to verify the authentication may be correct 706. If theauthentication fails, an error may be reported 714 and the process ends716. When the authentication is successful, a token may be issued 708 tothe client application. The client application may then submit the tokenwith a payload request 710 to the API management tool. The APImanagement tool may check the token to see if it is valid 712. If thetoken is not valid, an error response may be returned 714. If the tokenis valid, the token may be resolved to the organization ID based onmapping of the token and the organization 718. The organization ID andthe payload request may then be forwarded to the blockchain API and theprocess ends 716.

The payload request may be the booking request data for the bookingrequest API (or other shipping document API). When the token andorganization ID are confirmed by the system, the data may be stored tothe same database as other booking reservation requests are made. Thedata may be encrypted and stored in a blockchain database. As describedherein, the data for the booking request may contain header fields. Eachdata attribute may have a corresponding header field. The dataattributes may be stored into the database with a corresponding headerfield, or without. In the case where data may be stored without a headerfield, each data attribute may contain a pointer to the header fieldwhere it came from, so when the data is read, the data may be properlyshown in the proper field. Similarly, the header data may be useful whenusing the encrypted data to construct the relationship between thevarious parties, such as when making a Bill of Lading (B/L).

In some embodiments, an overview of the process for distributingencrypted data and encrypted data encryption keys is shown in FIG. 8 .The process may begin at the Start block 802, the system may encryptdata and data encryption keys 804 as described herein. The system maythen find, access or locate the ledger 806 of the sender and the variousshipment parties by using their organization IDs. The system may checkto see if the ledgers of all the shipment parties may be found. If aledger is not found, the system may return an error 810 response and theprocess ends. If the ledgers for all the shipment parties are found, thesystem may then proceed to send data and data encryption keys to theledgers.

The system may then proceed to send the encrypted data and encrypteddata keys and may check for send success 808 (receipt verification) tothe various appropriate ledgers. If the send is successful, then theprocess may proceed to the end block 812.

In some embodiments, a user may obtain booking information via a getbooking process 900, as shown in FIG. 9 . The process may start 902 withthe system executing a find for the latest version 904 of the booking.The system may find the latest version 904 of a booking by a uniquebooking ID in the shipping document database. The record may contain theledger name. The system may search for the latest version (of thebooking) by the unique booking ID 904. In some embodiments, the systemmay not find the correct data record. When this happens, the system mayproduce and return an error 918. If the data record is found, the systemmay check the organization's access policy and check the access policydefinition 906 to see what data the organization permissions may be. Ifthe organization does not have an access policy assigned to its role,the system may return an error 918 and the process ends 920. If theaccess policy and definition are properly identified, the system maythen collect the encrypted booking data and encrypted data encryptionkey from the ledgers of the booking 908. The ledgers of the booking maybe located by their ledger names. The system may do a check correlation910 step where the encrypted booking data and encrypted data encryptionkeys may be checked to see if they are the same in the distributedledgers. If not, then an error 918 response may be returned and theprocess ends. If the data does correlate in different distributedledgers, the process may login to the key store 912 and the key storedecrypts the data encryption key using the private key of the senderorganization. If the key store cannot decrypt the data, and error 918response may be generated and the process ends. The system may thendecrypt the data and key 914 and post the decrypted information 916 forthe user. The process may then go to the End block 920.

A sample list of bookings 1000 is shown in FIG. 10 . Here each bookingcreated by a shipper using the booking API, may be listed and sortedbased on a variety of different search criteria. The sample list ofbookings 1000 may represent the database of booking records, which maybe encrypted and stored in a database as described herein.

An example of databases may be seen here in Table I.

Database Name Description of data in database ID repository A list ofusers, user login credential and user parameter Access policy Globalmember list, list of access policy documents, repository list of rolelists and list of dynamic access policies Public key A list of publickeys of users repository Key store A list of private keys of usersShipping document A list of shipping documents, e.g. booking requestdatabase Global user list A list of all users and the roles of eachmember may take in various shipping documents Role List policy List ofusers and roles with access rights defined.

FIG. 11 illustrates a process to retrieve booking 1100 already placed inthe system. The process begins at the start block 1102 and may proceedto do an attribute verification 1104 on whether the submitted requestfor the booking contains a unique booking ID and the sender'sorganization ID. In some embodiments, the system may use the bookingnumber, version and booking provider's organization ID. The system mayevaluate whether the request may have the attributes (attributeverification 1104) required. If the request does not have the requiredattributes, an error response 1116 may be generated and the process ends1118. If the request has the required attributes, then the process mayget the booking information from the shipping document database anddecrypt the encrypted booking information 1106. In some embodiments, thedatabase may be encrypted in a blockchain format and stored in adistributed ledger, or a hyper-ledger. The system may check to ensurethe desired booking is properly retrieved and decrypted 1108. If not,the system may generate an error response 1116. If the booking isretrieved and decrypted, the system may now do a shipment role check1110, and may determine for each shipment party whether the organizationID of its organization may be the same as the sender's organization ID.If yes, the system may collect the shipment role of the shipment party.

The system may perform a shipment role check 1110 to verify that atleast one shipment role is collected, then for the collected shipmentroles, the system may get the attributes that may be allowed to be readby those roles. In some embodiments, the system checks to see eachshipment party role, and identifies the attributes the party may beallowed to see based on the shipment role check 1110. The attributeswhich the party may not be allowed to see are removed in a filterattributes 1112 check, in some embodiments. On success 1114, a successresponse code may be returned.

Any errors that may remain unresolved may terminate the process at theend 1116 step.

The creation of a booking reservation is now shown in FIG. 12 . Once thebooking payload request is received from a user or organization, theprocess of making the booking begins (start block 1202). The system mayfirst check to see if the submitted request contains a reference bookingnumber and the user's organization ID 1204 (check attributeverification). If the user's organization ID and/or the booking numberare not in the submitted request, then the system may report an error1234 and the process may end 1236. If the organization ID and bookingnumber are present, then the system may find a role list of the bookingby locator key 1206. The locator key may be constructed by referencebooking number and the user's organization ID. If the role list is notfound, then the system may report an error 1234 and the process may end1236. If the role list exists, then the system may check whether theaccess policy of the booking might be defined 1208. If the access policyis not defined, the system may return an error 1234 and the process mayend 1236. If the access policy is defined, then the system may check foreach shipment party, check whether the organization ID of the shipmentparty may be the same as the sender's organization ID. If one or moreorganization IDs may be the same, then the system may collect theshipment role of the shipment parties 1210.

The system may then check to see if at least one shipment role may becollected. If no role is collected, an error may be returned 1234 andthe process may end 1236. If at least one role may be identified, thenthe system may check whether the collected shipment roles have accessrights to create all submitted attributes of the booking data 1212. Ifthe role does not have the access rights, an error may be returned 1234and the process may end 1236. If the access rights are correct, then thesystem may generate a unique booking ID for the booking 1214. Once thebooking ID is created, the system may generate individual dataencryption keys for each data attribute 1216. The keys may be symmetrickeys. After the encryption keys are generated, the system may encrypteach data attribute with its data encryption key 1218. In someembodiments, there may be one data encryption key for each dataattribute encrypted (a 1:1 relationship). The system may then retrievethe shipment role information for each shipment party, and may alsoretrieve the access control policy for each shipment role 1220. If ashipment party has an access control policy, the system may retrieve thepublic key from the public key repository 1222. The system may retrievethe proper key for the particular organization ID associated with theparty assigned to the role. For each shipment party, for the dataattributes which can be read, the system encrypts the corresponding dataencryption keys one by one with the public key of the shipment party1224. The system may then distribute the encrypted data and encrypteddata encryption key to the proper organization 1226. The system mayverify that the data and keys are distributed to all ledgers of relatedshipment parties successfully 1228. In some embodiments, the ledger mayreturn a response to indicate whether the encrypted data and encrypteddata keys were successfully distributed or not. If the system cannotverify proper distribution, the system may generate an error code 1234and the process may stop 1236. If the system does verify thedistribution of the encrypted data and encrypted data encryption keys,then the system may save the ledgers' name, the unique booking ID andthe booking version number in the shipping document database 1230. Thesystem may then generate a successful response code 1232 and the processmay end 1236.

In some embodiments, a shipping document control hub 1302 of the system1300 may be seen in FIG. 13 . In some embodiments, the shipping documentcontrol hub 1302 may have a series of user nodes (for illustrationspurposes and presented as an example, user node 1 1306, user node 2 1324and user node N 1342). Each user node may connect to a correspondingblockchain logic (1 through N) and own a blockchain node (1 through N).The blockchain logic 1 1320 and blockchain node 1 1322 may be part ofthe shipping document control hub 1302. The shipping document controlhub 1302 may also have an offchain database 1304.

Each user node may be assigned to one or more users. For example, afirst user node 1306 a may be assigned to a carrier organization, and asecond user node 1306 b may be assigned to another carrier organization.Each user, such as a vessel operator, a terminal operator, a consignee,a shipper, and so on may have a user node 1306 a-n assigned to them.Although three nodes are presented in the present figure, it should beunderstood that this figure is merely illustrative, and not meant to belimited in any way. The number of nodes the system may have isunlimited, as designated by the “n” notation. Each blockchain logic ineach node may also communicate with an offchain database 1304. In someembodiments, the user nodes 1306 a-n may access the blockchain logic1320 a-n to write encrypted data and an encrypted data encryption key(DEK) to one or more blockchain nodes 1322 a-n. The cryptographic accesslayer 1314 a-n may communicate with the blockchain logic 1320 a-nthrough a network communication 1318 a-n. Any data sent between thecryptographic access layer 1314 a-n and the blockchain logic 1320 a-nmay be encrypted. The cryptographic access layer 1314 a-n may do variousdecryption and encryption functions based on an access policy. Thecryptographic access layer 1314 a-n may generate symmetric dataencryption keys (DEK), encrypt data by the DEKs, encrypt DEKs by publickey of shipment parties and access a key store 1312 a-n to decrypt DEKs.The API interface 1316 a-n, cryptographic access layer 1314 a-n and thekey store 1312 a-n may exist in an isolated network or user node 1306a-n that may not be accessible without permission. The clientapplication 1308 a-n may connect to an API interface 1316 a-n to writeto, or get data from, a blockchain node 1322 a-n. The client application1308 a-n may be a computer, a server, or any computing device having aprocessor, with access to a memory device and access to a networkconnection to communicate with the blockchain API 1316 a-n. In someembodiments, the network connection may be secure. The blockchain API1316 a-n may pass a request from the client application 1308 a-n to thecryptographic access layer 1314 a-n. The client application 1308 a-n mayalso have a client application database 1310 a-n. The data in the clientapplication database 1310 a-n may be in plain text. The clientapplication 1308 a-n may search directly in the client applicationdatabase 1310 a-n. Users may access the client application 1308 a-n andthen the user node 1306 a-n and then the blockchain logic 1320 a-nthrough their own network connection 1318 a-n.

The description provided for user node 1306 may operate in a similar oridentical manner to that for user node 1324. In some embodiments, theblockchain node components described may be distributed ledgers. In someembodiments the blockchain node components may be hyper ledgers.

In some embodiments, an access control policy may be used to determinethe distribution of shipping documents as shown in FIG. 14 . In someembodiments, various parties may provide a shipping document from a usernode to a shipping document control hub. For example, an example carrierand an example shipper, both having client nodes, may communicate ashipping document to a shipping document control hub. Each user node mayhave, or may have access to, an API interface, a cryptographic accesslayer and a key store. In the example shown, the carrier may send theshipping document role list to the shipping document control hub, whilethe shipper may send the shipping document to the shipping documentcontrol hub. The shipping document role list and shipment document maybe encrypted.

The shipping document hub may have an access control policy (accesspolicy) with a static portion and/or a dynamic portion, as shown in FIG.14 . The static portion may include a global member list and a list ofaccess policy documents. The global member list may be used to determinean assigned role of a member. In some embodiments, a member may havemultiple assigned roles. The access policy may also have a list ofaccess policy documents. These generally refer to the types of documentsthat may be used between roles in a freight shipment. Some examplesinclude, but are not limited to; a bill of lading, a terminal load orunload manifest, a booking contract, a pre-booking contract, and so on.The access policy may have an access policy document corresponding toeach shipping document type. The relationship between the access policydocument and the shipping document type may be 1:1, or it may be 2+:1 orit may be 1:2+. These various relations and look up features may begenerally static. In some embodiments, the relationship between theaccess policy document and the shipping document type may be updatedand/or revised.

In some embodiments, each of the lists, data structures, databases andpolicies may have a dynamic version and a static version. The staticversion may be the last saved version, while archives of each savedversion may exist in the blockchain. A dynamic version may exist asusers or the systems updates or makes changes to any of the items to bestored in memory, or stored in the blockchain. In some embodiments, thedynamic version may exist only in temporary memory. In some embodiments,the dynamic version may be written to persistent memory or theblockchain.

In some embodiments, there may be a dynamic portion of the accesspolicy. The access policy may have a list of dynamic role lists. In someembodiments, the dynamic role list may have a locator key which maylocate a corresponding role list in the access policy. In someembodiments, a locator key may locate a role list or a shipmentdocument. The shipping document may or may not be part of the accesspolicy. The role lists may be constructed using the dynamic shipmentparties from one or more shipment documents. The list of dynamic accesspolicies may provide each shipping document with a correlation to aspecific access policy. In some embodiments, the role lists in thedynamic operation may be generated and submitted with the shippingdocument, the role list may be copied to a dynamic version of the staticaccess policy document (creating a dynamic and static access policydocument), and the dynamic access policy may be assigned to thatshipping document. In some embodiments, the dynamic access policy mayexist as long as the shipping document does, and the dynamic accesspolicy controls the distribution of the shipping document, and allrelated documents to that particular shipping number.

In some embodiments, a carrier sends a booking request to the shippingdocument control hub. The shipper example may be similar to the carrierexample, but the role list for the distribution of shipper's shippingdocument may be an existing role list in the shipping document controlhub. The existing role list in the shipping document control hub may becreated by the carrier previously, when the carrier submitted theshipment document and role list. The request may be sent to variousmembers based on the role list. The document control hub may notify eachuser of the booking request (or other document). For example, the vesseloperator may be notified that its vessel is to transport the specifiedcontainers, a terminal operator may be notified that it is to receivethe vessel transporting the containers, and a consignee may be notifiedto pick up the containers on an estimated delivery date. In someembodiments, they system may log that the various users have beennotified of their respective responsibilities in the booking request andlog that notification. In some embodiments, the various users mayprovide an acknowledgement to the booking request receipt (manually orautomatically). The response documents come back to the shippingdocument control hub and are routed to the carrier. The role list may bepart of the dynamic access policy, and the dynamic access policy may beused to control the distribution and sharing of documents for thistransaction until the transaction is complete. In some embodiments, thesystem may simply verify the data delivery and not need anyacknowledgment from the receiving parties.

In some embodiments, the access policy may have a global member (user)list. The global member (user) list may be a listing of all users of thesystem, and the role each user may take in various shipping transactionand documents. The roles may correspond to those used in the sharedshipping document (e.g., shipper, carrier, vessel operator, terminaloperator, and so on). The access policy may also have a list of accesspolicy documents, each applies to a shipping document type (e.g.Dangerous Goods (DG) certificate, Bill of Lading, Container Gate-inEvent, Container Gate-out Event, and so on). The access policy may alsohave a list of role lists, each pertaining to any shipping document withthe same locator key (e.g., Carrier+booking (BKG) Number). The accesspolicy may also have a list of dynamic access policies, each pertainingto any shipping document with the same locator key and shipping documenttype. The dynamic access policy may define which specific party cancreate, update, read, and/or receive the shared shipping document andmay create, update, and/or read at the attribute level. This dynamicaccess policy may be derived from a role list of a given locator keyand/or an access policy document of a given shared shipping documenttype.

When a user logs in to the user node to access the shipping documentcontrol hub, the user may be identified by their login credentials. Theuser's client application may send a shipping document role list to theshipping document control hub. The shipping document user node mayidentify, from the shipping document role list, the role list type. Theshipping document client may get from the shipping document control hub,any one or more of the following information from the access policy:

-   -   The user's role(s) from the global user list (or global member        list).    -   The role list type's access policy document    -   a shared access policy document for each shared shipping        document type, and    -   a list of dynamic access policies, where the dynamic access        policies are particular to a shipping document, the dynamic        access policy defining the access rights of each role to a        shipping document.    -   any other information linked to either the access policy, the        user ID or the user role.

The shipping document user node may verify if the user's role(s) may beallowed to create (update) the shipping document role list against theaccess policy document. The shipping document user node may identifyfrom the shipping document role list the roles with newly assignedvalues and further verify if the user's role(s) may assign those roles.

The verified shipping document role list may be encrypted and submittedto the shipping document control hub and may have it added to the accesspolicy of a particular locator key.

In some embodiments, the client application may send a shipping documentto shipping document user node. The user node may identify, from theshipping document, the document type and the locator key. The shippingdocument user node may get from the shipping document control hub thefollowing information from the access policy:—

-   -   The shipping document's dynamic access policy (at the document        hub, upon shipping document user node request to derive the        dynamic access control policy from role list of the given        locator key and access policy document of the given shipping        document type)    -   The shipping document type's access policy document    -   Any other information the user may have access or permissions        to.

The shipping document user node may also identify the role(s) the userplays from the dynamic access policy. The user node may verify if thoserole(s) may create (update) the shipping document against the accesspolicy document. The user node may identify from the shipping documentthe data attributes with newly assigned values and further verify ifthose role(s) may create (update) those data attributes.

In some embodiments, the verified shipping document may be encrypted andsubmitted to the shipping document control hub.

For example, a carrier may submit an encrypted role list and anencrypted shared shipping document to the shipping document control hub.The carrier (or other user) may send the role list first, identifiedwith a booking number or other document ID that ties the role list tothe shipping document. Alternatively, the shipping document may be sentwith (or after) the role list, and the shipping document may correlateto the role list with the locator key. The role list may be read, andthe role list may include a listing of the roles the carrier is tonotify. The role list may also have a digital signature of theoriginator (sender), allowing the role list to be correlated to theoriginator. The shipping document may contain data representing theterms of the proposed contract (quantity, delivery, schedule, and soon). These terms may be individually encrypted as data attributes. Thelist of roles may have specific shipment parties' names associated withthem.

The role list may be copied from the shipping document and added to anaccess policy unique to the shipping document. The access policy maycontain the information on each shipment party that may be involved inthe shipping document. The role list of the access policy may providethe identity of members that may receive data originally provided in theshipping document. Each shipment party on the role list may get dataappropriate to their particular role (function) from the shippingdocument.

The data attributes of the shipping document may be encrypted one by oneby separated symmetric keys. The symmetric keys may be encrypted one byone, with the public key corresponding to each shipment party that mayhave a role in the shipping document. The role of each shipment partymay be defined by the role list. The symmetric keys of the dataattributes may then be partitioned to each user (shipment party) whoneeds or requests the data attributes, and symmetric key of each dataattribute going to the proper shipment party may be encrypted using theparty's public key. The encrypted data attributes, the encrypted dataencryption key, the hash of the encrypted data attributes and documentoriginator's digital signature may then be sent to the shipment parties.

In some embodiments, the shipping document client may send the encryptedshared shipment document, encrypted data encryption keys (DEK), the hashof the encrypted data attributes and document originator's digitalsignature role list to the shipping document control hub. The shippingdocument control hub may use the locator key of the shipment document tofind the role list in the access policy. Based on the role list, theshipping document control hub may look up the list of recipients. Insome embodiments, the shipping document control hub may have accessright to decrypt the role list to get the list of recipients. In someembodiments, the user node may provide public keys of shipment partiesin the role list and the shipping document control hub may look up thelist of recipients based on the public keys. In some embodiments, theuser node may provide plain text of list of recipients to the shippingdocument control hub together with the shipment document. The list ofrecipients may be the parties (users) in the role list. The shippingdocument control hub may then distribute the encrypted shipment documentdata attributes, encrypted data encryption keys, hash of the encrypteddata attributes and document originator's digital signature to write tothe corresponding blockchain nodes according to the list of recipients.The shipping document control hub may check whether the document, keys,hash and signature write to the blockchain nodes successfully. If thedocument, keys, hash and signature write successfully, the shippingdocument control hub may publish an event to the originator's messagebroker hub to notify the originator the transaction was successful. Theshipping document control hub may also publish events with the encryptedshipment document, the encrypted data encryption keys and documentoriginator's digital signature to the list of recipients.

The access policy contains the information on each shipment party (user)that may be involved in the particular shipping document. The role listof the access policy may provide the identity of users that are toreceive data originally provided in the shipping document. Each user whois on the role list may get data appropriate to their role (function)from the shipping document.

The data attributes of the shipping document may be encrypted one byone, with runtime generated symmetric keys called data encryption keys(DEK). The DEKs may be encrypted one by one, with the public keycorresponding to each user that may have a role in the shipping documentand may have access rights to the corresponding attributes. The role ofeach user may be defined by the role list. The access right of each roleto each attribute may be defined by the access policy. The encrypteddata attributes, the encrypted DEKs, hash of the encrypted dataattributes and document originator's digital signature may then be sentto the appropriate member.

In some embodiments, a user may submit a status update to the shippingdocument control hub. The status update provides data, such as thecontainer of shipping document identification number 12345 was receivedand unloaded, and someone may have to pick them up. The terminal statusupdate for shipping document 12345 may not find any role list. So otherthan sending the update to the shipping document control hub, the statusupdate may be buffered in the user node. Another party may subsequentlysend the role list to the user node, this role list may have the sameshipping document ID (12345). The user node may continue to process theterminal status update.

The user node may get from the shipping document control hub thefollowing information from the access policy:

-   -   The terminal status update's dynamic access policy (the dynamic        access control policy may be derived from role list of the given        locator key and access policy document of the given shipping        status update type)    -   The shipping status update type's access policy document        The user node may identify the role(s) the user plays from the        dynamic access policy. The user node may verify if those role(s)        are allowed to create the shipping update status against the        access policy document. The user node may also verify if those        role(s) can create those data attributes of the shipping update        status.

This verified shipping status update may be encrypted and submitted tothe shipping document control hub.

In some embodiments, the user node may receive various documents fromthe shipping document control hub, based on the user's access policy:The terminal status update's dynamic access policy (the dynamic accesscontrol policy may be derived from role list of the given locator keyand access policy document of the given shipping status update type),and the shipping status update type's access policy document. Theshipping document user node may also identify the role(s) the user playsfrom the dynamic access policy. The shipping document user node mayverify if those role(s) are allowed to create the shipping update statusagainst the access policy document. The shipping document user node mayalso verify if those role(s) may create those data attributes of theshipping update status. After the verification, this verified shippingstatus update may be encrypted. The encrypted shipping status update,the encrypted data encryption keys, hash of the encrypted data anduser's digital signature may be submitted to the shipping documentcontrol hub with a list of recipients.

An example of the method of operation is now described.

In an example of a shipping operation of the present disclosure, thefollowing parties are involved:

Shipper: Factory A

Consignee: S-Mart

Carrier: XYZ

Route: China to USA

Cargo: Toys

No. of Containers: 5

In this example the shipping line is XYZ, and the shipping line isorganizing the transport of 5 containers of toys from factory A (locatedin China) to a port in the USA. The carrier generates a shippingdocument for the shipment.

TABLE II Header Field Data attribute Shipper Factory A Consignee S-MartLast Terminal Operator Long Beach, CA . . . . . . Vessel Operator SSFreighter Carrier XYZ

The carrier is the party that organizes that shipment of the toys fromChina to the USA. The carrier then provides the above shipment order tothe user node in plain text through a secured transmission. The usernode then encrypts the data attributes while leaving the header fieldsalone. Each data attribute is encrypted and has a separate dataencryption key.

TABLE III Header Field Data attribute Shipper Encrypt (“Factory A”, k1Key)* Consignee Encrypt (“S-Mart”, k2 Key)* Last terminal Encrypt (“LongBeach, CA”, k3 Key)* Vessel Operator Encrypt (“SS Freighter”, k4 Key)*Carrier Encrypt (“XYZ”, k5 Key)* *Data provided in encrypted fields donot represent actual encryption information. The text string is merelyillustrative. “Encrypt (“Factory A”, k1 Key)” means the text value“Factory A” is encrypted by “k1 Key”

The encrypted data may be recorded in the blockchain nodes, each dataencryption key (k1-k5 in this example) may be encrypted according to thepublic key of the user matching the assigned role and access policy. Inthis example, Shipper Factory A may have access rights to all dataattributes. The public key for Factory A may then be used to encrypt allkeys (k1, k2, k3, k4 and k5). All shipping documents may be encryptedseparately. The keys may also be encrypted individually (either seriallyor in parallel). The keys may be encrypted in a batch format so long asthe individuality of each key can be protected (each encrypted key canbe independently decrypted, and used to access the particular shippingdocument the key corresponds to without the key being able to decryptany other shipping document).

The rights of each shipment role to read, create or update the dataattribute of the shipping document may depend on the access rightsdefined by the system. In this example case, there may be a look uptable that provides the rules established by the system as follows:

TABLE IV Shipment Role D1 D2 D3 D4 D5 Shipper R R R R R Consignee R RLast terminal operator R R Vessel operator R R Carrier CRU CRU CRU CRUCRU

Table IV illustrates the access policy of different shipment roles (e.g.shipper, consignee, last terminal, vessel operator, carrier, etc.).D1-D5 are data attributes, which are encrypted by (k1-k5). R is “Read”,“U” is “Update” and “C” is “Create”. If consignee has access right(“Read”, “Update” or “Create”) on D1 and D5, the k1 and k5 will beencrypted by public key of the consignee.

[PC1] The public key of shipper Factory A may be used to encrypt allkeys (k1, k2, k3, k4 and k5). The public key for last terminal operatorLong Beach Terminal of the port in USA may be used to encrypt k2 and k3.The public key for the vessel operator SS Freighter of the shipment maybe used to encrypt k2 and k4, and finally, the public key for carrierXYZ may be used to encrypt all keys (k1, k2, k3, k4 and k5). The vesseloperator does not need to know any information about the shipper. Theinformation regarding the shipper may be invisible to the vesseloperator and the set of data attribute keys available for the vesseloperator may not include the key for the shipper's data attribute.

Once the encryption of keys is completed and/or stored, the individualusers may be notified the data is available. Each user, using their ownprivate key, may decrypt their respective key and access the system tosee the data in the distributed ledger, while the information of theother users remains safely encrypted.

In a more general form, the process for generating the proper keys foraccessing various data attributes having different owners may involve aprocess of generating keys and matching those keys to a user's assignedrole and access policy 1500 as shown in FIG. 15 . After the start block1502, the process may generate a data encryption key for each dataattribute 1504. In some embodiments, the keys may be symmetrical keys.Encryption keys may be made for each data attribute. The system mayretrieve the shipment role for each shipment party 1506. As describedherein, each party may have a shipment role in the booking. The role maybe any defined role in the system. Additional roles may be added to thesystem to accommodate additional parties (each user may be a party tothe single, shipping transaction, but a user does not have to be a partyto the single shipping transaction) as often as desired. In someembodiments, a single user may have one shipment role. In someembodiments a single user may have two or more shipment roles. In someembodiments, a user may access the system without a formal shipmentrole, as described herein. The process may retrieve the access controlpolicy of each shipment role 1508. The access control policy may providethe information to inform the process what data attributes each shipmentparty may have access to. The process may then provide public keys forthe shipment parties with access control policies 1510. Here eachshipment party that may have access to control policies may also have apublic key stored in a public key repository. The process correlates theshipment party's role with the access control policy to see which dataattributes the shipment party may have access to. The process may thenretrieve the appropriate public key of the shipment party. The processmay then encrypt corresponding data encryption keys with the public keyof the shipment party 1512. The encryption of the data encryption keysmay be done one by one, in serial fashion. In some embodiments, theencryption of the data encryption keys may be done in parallel. In stillother embodiments, the encryption of the data encryption keys may bedone in a batch. Each data encryption key may be encrypted such thateach key encryption key corresponds to one or more data encryption keys,and each one-to-many relationship of the key encryption key and theencrypted data key corresponds to a single data attribute. It may bethought of as a one-to-many, or one-to-one relationship (1:m and 1:1).Once the process is completed, the process may end 1514.

In some embodiments, a party may be added to the role list or accesspolicy, but that party may not have an actual role in the shipment. Insome embodiments, a non-shipment role party may be a financialinstitution. In some embodiments the non-shipment role party may be aregulatory or government body. In some embodiments, the non-shipmentrole party may be an insurance company, a bondsman, a judicial body, atrade regulator, a labor organization, or any other entity that mayaccess or review the data for at least one data field of a document,access policy or other library of the system described herein.

FIG. 16 provides another example of the process for encrypting dataattributes based on roles and access control policies. In this example1600, five roles are presented in the form of a shipper, consignee, lastterminal, vessel operator and a carrier. In some embodiments, there maybe one party per role. In some embodiments, there may be one partyhaving more than one role. In still other embodiments, two or moreparties may share a single role. For the example depicted in FIG. 16 ,there are five roles, and one party per role.

In some embodiments, a data and key structure 1602 may contain five dataattributes (D1-D5) as shown. Each data attribute may be individuallyencrypted with a data encryption key 1606 (k1-k5). Each data attributemay also have a header and data attribute field. As shown in the sampleaccess control policy 1604, each role (shipper, consignee, etc. . . . )has access control defined for headers and a header (top row)corresponding to each data attribute (H1→D1, H2→D2, H3→D3, H4→D4 andH5→D5). The intersection between the row (role) and column (header)provides the access policy for the role (the party of the left handcolumn for the matching row). For example, the shipper has the “R”access according to the access control policy. The shipper can “read”data attributes corresponding to D1-D5. However, the shipper may notupdate or modify the data, nor may the shipper create any data. Thecarrier, on the other hand may have create (C), read (R) and update (U)authority according to the sample access control policy of FIG. 16 . Theother parties, such as the consignee, may only read the data for H1 andH5, corresponding to D1 and D5. The last terminal may only read the datafor H2 and H3, corresponding to D2 and D3. The vessel operator may onlyread the data for H2 and H4, corresponding to D2 and D4.

The data encryption keys may then be encrypted by the public key foreach party having a role matching in the access control policy. In thisexample, the shipper has a public key (S_(pub)) that can be used toencrypt each data encryption key k1-k5 individually, as shown in thepublic key encryption of data encryption keys 1608 table. The row of theshipper in 1604 table means the shipper will have access to read thedata attributes D1-D5, but will not be able to create, delete or updatethose fields. The consignee has a public key (Co_(pub)) that is used toencrypt the data encryption keys (DEK) corresponding to H1 and H5, whichare the two data attributes the consignee has access to according to theconsignee's access control policy 1604. The consignee's public key isused to encrypt k1 and k5. The encrypted k1 and k5 may be referred to asa DEK, and the consignee may have a DEKs for D1 and D5, which weabbreviate as k1 and k5. The consignee may receive k1 and k5 throughtheir user node in the system. The consignee may then use k1 and k5 toaccess the data attributes corresponding to D1 and D5. The process maybe the same for the last terminal, vessel operator and the carrier. Eachparty with a role may access their appropriate DEKs through their usernodes in the system, and may then access the data attributecorresponding to the DEK.

FIG. 17 illustrates an embodiment 1700 with a shipping document with aunique ID 1706 and a role list 1710. The access policy 1702 may be rolebased. It may have two levels. One level may be a document object levelfor the creation, update, logical delete, and reading of the shippingdocument 1706 per role. It may also provide an attribute level thatpermits the creation, update and reading attributes of the shippingdocument 1706. The role list access policy 1704 may be role based. Italso may have two levels. One level may be a role list object level forthe creation, update, logical delete, reading per role of a role list1710. It may also have a role attribute level that permits the creation,updating and reading of the role list 1710. In some embodiments, ashipping document 1706 may be assigned a role list. The role list 1710plus the shipping document access policy 1702 may provide the privilegesof each user that is party to the shipping document. In someembodiments, each shipping document may have its own role list, and itsown access policy. Each user may have a defined role on the roll list,and a defined access in the access policy. The intersection of the rolefor each user and the access of each user may define the privileges ofthat user. A role list may apply to many different shipping documents.e.g. a shipment role list may apply to a DG certificate, a bill oflading, terminal load or discharge events, or any other forms ofshipping document 1706. These different forms of shipping documents mayalso be referred to as document types 1714 and event types 1716.Document types 1714 and event types 1716 may define a group of supportedtypes of shipping documents 1706. In some embodiments, the shippingdocument 1706 of document type 1714 has versioning. In some embodiments,the version number of a document may increase incrementally each timethe document is edited or modified. It may be used to support multipleversions of the same original shipping document. Each shipping document1706 may have a unique ID. There may also be many kinds of role lists1710. Shipment role list 1718, role list for container 1720 are some ofthe possible type of role list 1710. The shipping document 1706 and therole list 1710 may use locator key 1708 and locator key 1712respectively. In some embodiments, the locator key 1708, locator key1712 may not be encrypted. The locator key 1708, locator key 1712 may bevisible to the shipping document control hub and may be used to supportits (the hub) function. The locator keys may allow for a key basedlookup, e.g. shipment number to identify related role list(s) 1710 andrelated shipping document(s) 1706. The shipping document 1706, by itstype, may identify the access policy 1702.

FIG. 18 illustrates some example role lists and role list policies. Insome embodiments, a role list access policy locator key 1802 may provideexample headers of “role list type” and “locator key fields.” Beneaththe “role list type is the “shipment role list” and under the LocatorKey Fields are the carrier and booking number. This illustrates that thelocator key fields of the shipment role list are the carrier and thebooking number. A role list access policy example 1804 may show thecategories of the role list types, where a shipment role list isprovided. The roles are shown as: shipper, consignee, carrier, vesseloperator and terminal operator. In this example table, the shipment rolelist indicates the carrier has the authority and system privileges tocreate a role list. None of the other roles in this example may create arole list. The next table shows a role attribute level example 1806.Here the “Role List Type” shows the “shipment role list” in the firstcolumn, and the “role attribute” in the second column. The individualroles from the role list access policy example 1804 are now listed inthe role attribute column. The remainder of the table shows the “role”vs “role attribute” access privileges to either create, read or update(modify) a role attribute of a role list shipping document. The box inbold lines shows the second and third columns, and indicates the shippermay read all the roles of the shipment role list, however the shippermay not create or update any role attributes in the shipment role list.The role list example has role list locator key 1808 and role listcontent 1810. Role list locator key 1808 illustrates a carrier XYZ and abooking number 123456. The shipment role list may include role listcontent 1810, which may illustrate the identity of various users intheir roles (for purposes of illustration only, these identities arefictitious).

Several example shipping documents 1900 are now shown, the documents mayillustrate commercially relevant headers, but use fictitious data forillustration purposes only, as shown in FIG. 19 . In some embodiments,there may be a shipping document of a container gate out event 1902(from a terminal operator). The example table shows the event ID (theunique identifier of the shipping document), the carrier and bookingnumber, (the carrier and booking number may allow the locating of therole list), and information about the intermodal container at theterminal. This information may be sent to the shipping document controlhub and redistributed to other users identified on the role list, soeach user may be notified simultaneously of this particular gate outevent. The shipping document access policy may have 3 portions—“RoleList Locator” key 1904, “shipping document access policy” 1906 and“shipping document access policy for gate out event field level” 1910.Role list locator key 1904 (an example of FIG. 17 1708) indicates thatfor a gate out event, the shipment role list may apply and the carrierand booking number may be used to locate the role list, which may beretrieved from the gate out example 1902 as Carrier XYZ and bookingnumber 12345. The shipping document level policy example 1906 Indicatesthat for a gate out event, the five roles shown may read this shippingdocument type “Gate Out event” shipping document, but only the terminaloperator (the originator of this event) role may create or updateshipping document. In some embodiments, a role, such as the terminaloperator, may also perform a logical deletion of the shipping document.

In some embodiments, the shipping document schema example 1908 mayillustrate a field name in the left column (the “header field”), alongwith data attribute types in the column to the right. The sample dataattributes may be any length, and the string lengths shown are merelyillustrative. As illustrated in this example 1908, Event ID, is theunique ID for this shipment document type; and the carrier and bookingnumber fields are the role lists locator key for this shipment documenttype. The shipping document policy field level example 1910 provides anillustration of the shipping document type (a gate out event in thisexample) and a field column, showing the various header fields from theschema example 1908, and the gate out event example 1902. The field listin the 3^(rd)-7^(th) (third through seventh) column of the field levelexample 1910 shows which role has what rights for each field. All theroles to the single transaction may read the data, while the carrier andterminal operator may update (modify) the data. Since the shippingdocument gate out event is an asset originating from the terminaloperator, only the terminal operator may create this kind of shippingdocument.

In some embodiments, the system and methods described herein may be usedwith dangerous goods (DG), as seen in FIG. 20 . Dangerous goods mayrequire a special certificate to ship, referred to herein as a dangerousgood certificate (DG Cert). Dangerous goods in shipping freight occurwhen the material being shipped may be hazardous, or has qualities thatcould lead to danger for those involved in the shipping process.Examples of dangerous goods may include fuel, radioactive materials,corrosive chemicals and liquids, explosives, and so on. In someembodiments 2000 of an example, a shipping document for a DG certexample 2002 table is shown. The header field represents the left handcolumn and provides the categories of information. The data attribute inthe right hand column shows the corresponding data for each category.The role list locator information may represent the carrier and bookingnumber. The cargo description may also be listed. The role list locatorinformation may be used to access the DG cert role list example, whichmay be composed of Shipping document Access policy Role list Locator key2004, the document level access policy 2006 and the field level accesspolicy 2008. The role list locator key 2004 indicates that for each gateout event, there may be a shipment role list (for the “Role List Type”and a carrier and booking number are used to as the “Locator KeyFields.” The document level access policy 2006 illustrates a tableshowing the access policy of the shipping document type “DG Cert” at thedocument level. The example parties associated with the shipping of thedangerous good are shown, along with their respective read (R), create(C), update (U) and delete (D) authority. The DG cert schema example2010 provides the header and data attribute type for the DG certificate(shipping document) for the present example. The “shipping documentaccess policy Example for DG Cert-Field level (Field may refer to thedata entry field in a document)” 2008 provides the correlatedinformation for the shipping document type (DG Cert), the fields drawnfrom the DG cert example 2002 and the DG cert schema example 2010, andshows each party's (user's) respective rights.

In an example, an illustration of the logical system layout 2100 may beseen in FIG. 21 . In some embodiments, there may be a system forgenerating a shipping document. The system may have a shipping documentcontrol hub 2102 and a first user node 2104. The shipping documentcontrol hub may have a computer comprising a logic, a memory and acommunication device. A document control hub side message broker 2106may operate through the computer logic. The message broker 2106 may sendand receive one or more event messages 2108, 2110. There may be anaccess policy repository 2112 that may be stored on the memory. Theremay also be a public key repository 2114 and an ID repository 2116 onthe memory. The memory may be one or more physical devices and they neednot be physically contained within the computer. So long as the computermay access the various databases described, the physical memory may bedistributed in a physical sense. The ID repository 2116 may have alisting of one or more users, one or more user login credentials and oneor more user parameters. The memory may be a blockchain node for storingone or more of access policies for the encrypted shipping documents. Thefirst user node 2104 may have a computer with a logic, a memory, and acommunication device. Similar to the shipping document control hub, theclient (user) nodes 2104, 2118 may have the memory of the computer andmay be more than one memory device which may be internal or external tothe computer, so long as the computer may access the memory device(s). Akey store 2120, 2122 may be part of the user node, the key store mayhold a login ID secret, and a private key for the user. The key storemay be accessible by the computer. The user node 2104, 2118 may alsohave an API interface with a cryptographic access layer for electroniccommunication with the key store and a user message broker 2124, 2126.The user node may have a portal for a user to access the shippingdocument control hub, wherein the API interface may execute on thelogic, and communicate with the shipping document control hub messagebroker.

In some embodiments, communication between the user node and theshipping document control hub may be handled by message brokers. Thesystem may use a secure network communication between each node and theshipping document control hub (hub). The message brokers may provide thesecure network communication for the nodes and the hub to passinformation to each other. The application programming interface (API)of the user node may be a computer implemented program providing anaccess layer for cryptographic exchange between the key store and themessage broker. The access layer may be implemented on a computer logicor processor. The client application may be any interface for a user toaccess the API interface and the message broker. The client applicationmay be proprietary software or may be off-the-shelf software. Themessage broker of each node may access the blockchain logic in the hub,and encrypted shipping documents may be stored in a blockchain format,with one or more encrypted field assigned to each node. Each memoryelement may have any number of blockchain databases, as there may be oneblockchain database for each shipment document type.

In some embodiments, a sample flow chart 2200 of a role list submissionmay be seen in FIG. 22 . In some embodiments, when a role list issubmitted, the role list may have an initial check attributeverification 2202. In this step the process checks whether the locatorkey (e.g. the booking number and the sender's organization ID (SCACcode)) and the role list (role list also includes role list type) may bein the request. If they are, then the process may perform a role check2206 to see if the sender's organization ID may be one of the parties inthe role list. If yes, the process checks to see if the role list accesspolicy is defined 2208. This step involves checking the role list accesspolicy of that role list type. The process may then check for an accessright check 2210 to lookup the role of the sender's organization by theID repository and check whether the sender's role has the access right(role list level and a data field in a role list, sometimes referred toherein as a “role list field level”) to create a role list and createroles in the role list. If at any point the process fails to produce ausable result, the process may end and may return an error response code2212 and then terminated (end 2234). If all steps are successful, theprocess may generate encryption keys 2214 for all roles in the rolelist. Using the encryption keys, the process may encrypt the role list2216. The process may generate a hash by the encrypted role list andaccess the key store to sign the hash by the sender's private key togenerate sender's signature 2218. The process may get public keys 2220for each party on the role list, and encrypt data encryption keys 2222according to the access control policy of each party using the party'spublic key. The process may pack the message by using the encrypted Rolelist, encrypted data encryption key (associated with party's publickeys), hash and sender's signature. The process may digitally sign themessage with the user's private key to generate the user's signature.The message may be sent to the shipment document control hub 2223. Theprocess may then distribute data and encryption keys 2224 by finding theblockchain nodes of the parties and distributing the encrypted role listand encrypted data encryption keys to the respective blockchain nodes.The process may then check distribution success 2226 by checking whetherthe encrypted data, encrypted data encryption keys, hash and sender'ssignature are distributed successfully. The process may then publish theevent with success code 2232 to the message broker, or publish the eventwith an error code 2228 to the message broker.

In some embodiments, the client application may create a role list andcommunicate to the shipping document control hub via the client sidemessage broker and user node. The cryptographic access layer in the usernode may get the public keys and the access control policy from the hub.The access layer may then validate and enforce the access controlpolicy, encrypt a payload (role list) and put the message to the messagebroker. The message broker (client side) may communicate with themessage broker of the shipping document control hub, and the messagebroker on the shipping document control hub side gets the message to theprocess to distribute encrypted data and encrypted data keys, and thenmay publish the event with a success code 2232 that may go to the clientside message broker. The client side may acknowledge the success messageand confirmation receipt, and may create a transaction completeacknowledgement.

In some embodiments, there may be a process for reading a shippingdocument 2300 as shown in FIG. 23 . The process may begin at start blockwith a given document ID (e.g. DG Cert ID) (In some embodiments, aversion number may be given), shipment number, sender's organization ID(e.g. SCAC (standard carrier alpha code)) and a particular role listtype. It proceeds to check attribute verification 2302. In this step theprocess may check whether the locator key (shipment number, sender'sorganization ID), document id and role list type are valid. If so, theprocess gets the encrypted role list, and encrypted data encryption keys2304 from the sender's node using the role list's locator key and rolelist type (not shown). If role list cannot be found, the process mayreturn an error response code 2316 and may then go to the end block2322. If role list can be found, the process may check the correlationof the role list 2310. The process may check to see if the role listdata in all the blockchain nodes matches against each other. If rolelist data in any blockchain node does not match with other blockchainnodes, the process may return an error response code 2316 and may thengo to the end block 2322. If role list data are the same in allblockchain nodes, the process may access the key store 2312 to decryptthe data encryption keys 2314. If the data encryption keys cannot bedecrypted, the process may return an error response code 2316 and maythen go to the end block 2322. If the data encryption keys can bedecrypted, the process may use the data encryption keys to decrypt rolelist 2318. The process may then return a success response code 2320, oralternatively if the process fails, the process may return an errorresponse code 2316. The process may then go to the end block 2322.

A flow chart showing a shipping document creation 2400 is now shown inFIG. 24 . In some embodiments, the process may check the attributeverification 2402 by checking whether the locator key (e.g. bookingnumber and sender's organization ID) and the shipping document content(e.g. DG cert) and the shipping document type may be in the request. Theprocess may check if there may be an existing role list 2404 from theaccess policy repository. This step may involve checking the accesspolicy repository for the applicable role list type, then checking foran existing role list of that role list type. A shipment role check 2406(or simply a role check) may determine whether the sender's organizationID is one of the parties on the role list. The process may check to seeif the access policy may be defined 2408 at the shipping document leveland shipping document field level. The process may do an access rightcheck 2410 to lookup the role of the sender's organization in the IDrepository and may check whether the sender's role has the correctaccess right (shipment document level and field level) to create ashipping document of that type (e.g. DG cert) and create data in it. Theprocess may then generate a unique shipping document ID 2412 (e.g. DGcert ID), which may be unique throughout the entire system. The processmay generate data encryption keys 2414 for all the data attributes inthe shipping document. The data attributes may then be encrypted 2416 inthe shipping document (e.g. DG cert) using the data encryption keys. Theprocess may generate a hash on the encrypted data attributes and accessthe key store to sign the hash by the sender's private key to generatethe sender's signature 2418. Then the public keys may be obtained 2420for each party identified in the roles in the shipping document. Thedata encryption keys may be encrypted 2422 using the appropriate publickey for each party identified with a role in shipping document. Theprocess may pack 2424 the message with the encrypted data attributes,encrypted data encryption keys, hash and sender's signature. The processmay send 2426 the message to the shipping document control hub. Theshipping document control hub may distribute the encrypted data, keys,hash and sender's signature by finding the blockchain nodes of theproper parties and distributing the encrypted shipping document,encrypted data encryption keys (DEKs), hash and sender's signature tothe blockchain nodes. The process may check to see if the distributionwas successful 2428 by having each user node respond with a notificationof success. Alternatively, the process may distribute the message andlog the distribution as successful unless an error message is receivedfrom one or more recipients. A successful event notification may bepublished to the sender 2432. The role list recipients may receive apublish event with the encrypted shipping document, encrypted DEK, hashand sender's signature 2430. The publication of events to any recipientmay depend on whether the recipient subscribed to the update event of aparticular shipping document type (e.g. “DG cert created.”). Therecipient user node may check the integrity 2436 by computing the hashfrom the encrypted shipping document and decrypting sender's signatureby using the sender's public key to get the decrypted hash. The processmay compare the decrypted hash with the hash from the encrypted shippingdocument. The recipient nodes may then access the key store to decryptthe encrypted data encryption keys 2438 and decrypt the shippingdocument 2440 by the data decryption keys. The client application mayreceive the shipping document 2442 in plain text. The process may thengo to the end block 2448.

A flow diagram of a shipping document update 2500 is now shown in FIG.25 . The process may proceed from the start block 2502 to checkattributes 2504 by verifying whether Shipping document ID/locator key(e.g. booking number and carrier's organization ID (SCAC Code)) and theupdated Shipping document (e.g. DG Cert) may be in request. The processmay check for an existing shipping document 2506. This may be determinedfrom the blockchain ledgers by searching shipping document ID and/orlocator key and shipping document type. A check may be done to see ifthe existing role list 2508 may be found. The process may find the rolelist from the access policy repository by searching with one or morelocator(s) key and/or one or more role list type(s). A role check 2510may be done to determine whether the sender organization ID may be oneof the parties on the role list. The process may check to see if theaccess policy is defined 2512. The process may get the shipping documentaccess policy from a portion or the whole document by supplying“shipping document type” (e.g. shipping document type=“DG Cert”). Anaccess right check 2514 may be performed to determine whether thesender's role may have the access right (field level) to update the datavalues in the shipping document. The process may merge existing shippingdocument attributes with the encrypted data of submitted data attributesif available 2516. The process may increase the version number of theshipping document by one 2518. The process may generate data encryptionkeys 2520 for new data attributes in the submitted shipping document2522. For example, if there are 10 data fields, and 3 affect a user,only the three that affect the user are changed, so only 3 may need newencryption keys. The remaining 7 fields may not have new keys, and theold information that was already there simply remains. The process mayencrypt the submitted data attributes 2524 in the shipping document byusing the data encryption keys. The process may generate a hash on anynewly encrypted data attributes (data fields) and access the key storeto sign the hash by the sender's private key to generate sender'ssignature 2526. The process may get the public keys of the parties inthe role list 2528. The process may encrypt the updated data encryptionkeys 2530 by using each party's public key using the access controlpolicies of each party (user). The process may pack the message 2532with the encrypted data attributes, encrypted data encryption key, hashand sender's signature. The process may send the message to the shippingdocument control hub 2532. The process may distribute the encrypted dataand keys by finding the blockchain ledgers of the parties and distributethe encrypted shipping document, encrypted data encryption key, hash andsender's signature keys to the proper blockchain ledgers 2534. A checkwhether the encrypted shipping document, encrypted data encryption key,hash and sender's signature are distributed successfully 2536 may beperformed. A publish event with success code to sender may be performedwith a success code sent to the message broker of the sender 2550. Ifthe save to the transaction reference database is not done, the processmay publish an event with an error code to send to the sender's messagebroker instead 2554. The process may publish an event with an encryptedshipping document, encrypted data encryption key and sender's signatureto the intended recipients 2538. The publish events to recipient dependon whether the organization subscribes to the shipping document updateevent (e.g. “DG Cert Updated”). The event payload may contain anencrypted shipping document, an encrypted DEKs and the sender'ssignature. The recipient user node may check the integrity 2540 bycomputing the hash from the encrypted shipping document and decryptingsender's signature by using the sender's public key to get the decryptedhash. The process may compare the decrypted hash with the hash from theencrypted shipping document. If the integrity checking 2540 fails, theprocess may return error response code to recipient 2548. If theintegrity check succeeds, the recipient nodes may then access the keystore to decrypt data encryption keys 2542, and decrypt the shippingdocument 2544 by the data decryption keys. The client application mayreceive the shipping document 2546 in plain text. The process may thengo to the end block 2556.

An example process for reading a shipping document 2600 is now shown inFIG. 26 . The process begins at a start block 2602 and may proceed tocheck if a shipping document version number may be supplied in therequest, and checked against a transaction reference database 2604. Theprocess may then do an attribute verification 2606 to check whether theshipping document ID and/or locator key (booking number and sender'sorganization ID (SCAC Code)) and the shipping document type is inrequest. The process may get the encrypted shipping document andencrypted data encryption keys 2608 from sender's blockchain nodes byshipping document ID. (In some embodiments, there may be a correlationcheck (check correlation 2610) to see whether the encrypted shippingdocument and encrypted data encryption keys from the blockchain nodesare the same in content level.)

The user node may access the key store 2612 to decrypt data encryptionkey (DEK) using the private key of the sender's organization and getback the data encryption keys (DEK) 2614. The user node may decrypt theencrypted shipping document 2618 by data encryption keys and may returna success response code 2620 to the client application. If the processfails at any point, the process may return an error 2616 code to theclient application. The process may end 2622.

In some embodiments, the existing role list, and/or the existingshipping document may be checked by the user node or the shippingdocument hub for data integrity, in one or more of the steps when theyare being accessed. The integrity check process starts by computing thehash from the encrypted shipping document (or role list) and comparingit with the existing hash in the existing shipping document (or rolelist). The sender's signature can be verified against its public key. Ifthe existing hash matches with the computed hash and the sender'ssignature verification is successfully verified, it is a valid signatureand the integrity of the documents is maintained.

Once a user is able to access the booking API, the user may populate abooking arrangement 2700 (example). The booking arrangement 2700 mayhave multiple fields for the input of data relevant to the freightshipment. Fields may include, but not be limited to, identity of theshipper, consignee, vessel operator, forwarder, carrier, and the bookingparty, which may be the user. The booking arrangement 2700 may also haveroute information, container/cargo information and other ormiscellaneous information, as needed. The user creating the booking maysee all the data attributes in the booking arrangement. Additionalinformation that the booking user may enter into the booking arrangement2700 may include information that may be confidential to the user. Whenthe booking arrangement 2700 is entered into the system, each field maybe treated separately. For example, the shipper in the bookingarrangement 2700 may view the record once it is created, but the shippermay only see information relevant to them (e.g., actual price of theshipping handling). In another example, the consignee may seeinformation relevant to them (e.g., the location to return emptyintermodal containers). The booking version number 2702 represents theversion the user is viewing. Generally, users may see the latestversion. In some cases, a user may search for older records than themost recent.

A sample screen shot of a partial booking view 2800 as viewed by avessel operator is now shown in FIG. 28 . The screen shot includes theidentity of the carrier, but may hide the identity of the booking party,the shipper, forwarder and consignee. In addition, there may beinformation in the route information, part of container/cargoinformation or other information fields that remain hidden from the viewof the vessel operator. In this way the user who made the partialbooking view 2800 (the booking party) may populate all the informationrelevant to every other party engaged in the shipping of the cargo. Theshipping document may contain the information every party uses or relieson to do their part of the transaction, yet keeps hidden any informationthe booking party may not want to share. The booking party may definewhat fields they want others to see, who those other parties are, or thebooking party may use a set of standardized protection fields. Thatbeing the system may decide which fields a user may see, based on theaccess control policy for each user's role.

In some embodiments, a party that may not be user of the system in theaccess role policy may still gain access to certain material andinformation in the system by having a permission from a user in theaccess role policy. Such a non-user party may be a bank or otherfinancial institution, a government entity (such as a port inspector) orother third party with an ancillary interest in the shipping transaction(such as an insurance company, customs agent, repair facility or anyother party).

In some embodiments, a user may request that a third party have accessto certain data within the system. Alternatively, the user may requestto have certain information in the system verified to a 3rd partynon-user of the system. The user may make a request for verification tothe system, and the non-user may gain access to certain information soas to verify statements made by the user. The process may be done withor without direct action from the system, and allow confidentialitybetween the user and the 3rd party non-user.

An illustration of the logical relationship of the system, the user andthe 3rd party non-user may be seen in FIG. 29 . In some embodiments, aregistered user 2902 with a user node 2908, may make requests to thedocument control hub 2906 through the user node 2908. In someembodiments, the user may communicate with a third party 2904 who maynot have any access rights to the document control hub 2906, nor be auser of the system as described herein. For instance, a message brokermay be configured to send a message to a third party 2904 (a third partynon-user), wherein the message comprises encrypted data from theshipping document control hub. The encrypted data may be restricted todata that a user 2902 (or a corresponding user node 2908) is able toaccess according to an access control policy and a user role list. Thethird party 2904 may be an organization or individual with an interestin the shipping activities of the user 2902, but not be a party to theshipping agreement. The third party 2904 may be a bank or other lendinginstitution, an insurance company, a broker, a repair facility, agovernment agency or government actor, or any other party that may havean interest in the shipping agreement, and have a need to access somedata or documents on the document control hub 2906, or any of thecontrolled databases supported by the system as described herein.

The user 2902 may communicate documents or information to the thirdparty 2904 party, specifically for the purpose of getting something fromthe third party 2904. This thing from the third party 2904 may be forthe user to engage in the shipping agreement, or to conduct businesswith the other users of the system. Examples may be financing for theshipping agreement, underwriting for an aspect of the agreement,insurance for the goods or the carrier, inspection of data to verifycontents of containers on arrival in a port, and so on.

To obtain the assistance of the third party 2904, the user 2902 maysubmit to the third party 2904 all documents the third party 2904 mayrequest, using encrypted and secure user and third party communication2912 protocols. The user and third party communication 2912 may includeencrypted data and data encryption keys from the user 2902, delivered tothe third party 2904 so the third party 2904 may properly view the data.In some embodiments, the third party 2904 may wish to verify theauthenticity of the data provided by the user 2902. The third party 2904may access a third party node 2910 to communicate with the documentcontrol hub 2906, and request verification of data received from theuser 2902. The third party node 2910 may be in communication with averification function in the document control hub 2906. In someembodiments, the third party 2904 may send encrypted data to thedocument control hub 2906 via the third party node 2910, and requestverification of the encrypted data. In some embodiments, the third party2904 may send encrypted data and encrypted data encryption keys fordecryption. The third party 2904 may send any additional materialprovided by the user 2902 for verification by the document control hub2906. The document control hub 2906 may send the information requiredfor verification back to the third party 2904 via the third party node2910.

In some embodiments, the third party 2904 may send encrypted data to thethird party node 2910, the third party node 2910 may generate a hash ofthe encrypted data and may provide the hash of the encrypted data andcompare it to the hash of shipping document recorded in the documentcontrol hub 2906. Matching hashes may reveal the data is authentic,though the document control hub 2906 may not actually release any datato the third party 2904. In some embodiments, the verification using keychecking, and hashes of the encrypted keys, or any other mechanism nowin existence or future derived may be allowed, that may suit the use ofthe document control hub 2906 and the user 2902 system. When the thirdparty 2904 can confirm the authenticity of the data from the user, thethird party 2904 may proceed with its internal operations to provide theuser 2902 with whatever is needed for the user to proceed with its partin the shipping agreement.

In some embodiments, the relation between the document control hub 3002(DCH) on the system side 3012, user 3022 and third party 3060 may beillustrated as shown in FIG. 30 . The DCH 3002 may have a shippingdocument database 3004 _(a), and may have other databases such as anaccess policy repository 3004 _(b), a public key repository 3004 _(c),an ID repository 3004 _(d) or any other database 3004 _(n) for operationof the system. The user 3022 may make a request from the DCH 3002 forcertain data and documents as the user 3022 may need for a bank loan.The user's request may be authenticated against the ID repository, andaccess policy repository or any other authentication methodology orrequirement. The user may be identified in the system 3012 or the DCH3002. The user may have one or more recipient-base encryption 3006_(a-n) on “data encryption key” resident on the system side. Once theuser request is authenticated, the DCH may extract the requested datafrom one or more databases and provide the information to the user 3022.The information may be bundled into a system produced data package 3006with encrypted data encryption key, then sent to the user 3022.

The data package 3006 may contain encrypted data and the data package3006 is sent with encrypted data encryption keys 3026. The user mayreceive the data package 3006 from the DCH 3002 or System 3012 via asecure communication link 3020. When the data package is in the user'szone of control, the user controlled data package 3024 may be modified,unpacked or left alone. In some embodiments, the data package 3024 maycontain more or less material. In some embodiments, the data encryptionkeys 3026 may be encrypted using the user's public key. The data package3024 and data encryption keys 3026 may be communicated to the user 3022.

On the user 3022 side, the user private key 3028 may be used to decryptthe encrypted data encryption keys 3026. The user may send the datapackage 3024 and decrypted data encryption keys 3026 to the third party3060. The user may send the data package 3024 to the third party 3060via a separate secure communication link 3064. Due to the encryptednature of the data, in some embodiments the user, the DCH/system or thethird party, may elect to use unsecure communications.

Once the third party 3060 has the encrypted data in their control, thethird party controlled data package 3062 and decrypted data encryptionkeys 3026 from the user 3022, the third party 3060 may access the DCH3002 through the third party node (not shown). The DCH 3002 may then usethe DCH hosted verification function 3010, verify the authenticity ofthe third party request using the encrypted data in the third party datapackage 3062. The third party 3060 may then receive confirmation thatthe information provided by the user 3022 may be authentic, since thehash, and other data encryption elements match that of the system 3012and/or the DCH 3002.

In some embodiments, a user may provide any amount of information to athird party as they have access too. Generally, a user may only providethat information which may be pertinent to the third party request forinformation. For example, a third party bank may request financialinformation, records of completed shipping agreements and payment fromparties downstream from the user. An insurance third party may requesthistory of shipping a particular kind of material, such as a hazardousgood, as well as what the user's history may be with requests related tonumber of accidents, number of prior insurance claims, and so on. Forexample, a government agency may act as a third party and requestinformation related to ultimate destination of a shipment, who anultimate buyer may be, or whether the cargo will or has passed throughthe territory of a particular country. The types of requests may belimitless. The user may then make the data request to the system. Thesystem may produce the data into the data package 3006. The data package3006 may contain encrypted data, a hash, a time stamp, and a signatureof the sender. The data package 3006 may contain additional material orless material, depending on the sender (user) request.

In some embodiments, the data package 3006 may be encrypted and sent toa user. In some embodiments, the data package 3024 the user possessesmay be identical in all respects to the data package 3006 assembled bythe system. However, since the user is now in control of the datapackage 3024, the data package 3024 is distinguished from the datapackage generated by the system 3006. The user 3022 may unpack the datapackage 3024 and share it with a third party 3060. The user may sharethe data package in its entirety (without unpackaging it) or mayunpackage it, and re-encrypt it and send to the third party. Forexample, the user 3022 may obtain the data package via a first clientnode, and the data package may be sent or distributed to a third party(a third party non-user). When the third party receives the datapackage, the data package 3062 is now under the control of the thirdparty. It may still be identical to the data package 3006 originallysent by the system, or identical to the data package 3024 of the user.The third party may seek to verify the contents of the data package3062. The third party may use (or communicate via) a third party node touse or access the verify function 3010 in the DCH. For example, thethird party may communicate with a verify function 3010 (also referredto as a verification function) in the DCH, to verify an integrity of thedata package. In some embodiments, the third party node may call theverification function 3010 in the DCH, the DCH may get the encrypteddata from the shipping document database 3004 a, or any other databaseas needed. The verification function 3010 may then send the encrypteddata to the third party node so the third party may compare theencrypted data from the verification function 3010 with the encrypteddata in data package 3062 provided by the user 3022. In someembodiments, the third party may send the hash of the data package 3062to the DCH hosted verification function 3010, and if the hash for thedata package 3062 is the same as for the data package 3006, the thirdparty may have evidence that the data provided is correct and unalteredfrom its source.

Example embodiments of the third party functions are now provided inFIGS. 31-35 . In some embodiments, a forwarder may get or need financingfrom a bank (a non-party to a shipping transaction). In order for thebank to lend money to the forwarder, the bank is to carry out its normaldue diligence to determine if the forwarder is an acceptable risk, andlikely to pay back any monies loaned to it. For this example, theforwarder may submit a loan application 3102 to a bank or other lendinginstitution, as shown in FIG. 31 . The bank goes through its own bankactivity 3120, while the forwarder goes through its own forwarderactivity 3118. In the process of applying for a loan, the forwarder isto provide various documents and data to the bank. This may be thoughtof as the application validation 3104 step. The bank then goes throughits own compliance check 3106 to determine if the forwarder is atrustworthy party, and a good financial risk. If so, the bank mayapprove and release the loan 3110 to the forwarder, and provide payment3108.

The forwarder can go through its activities and perform the shippingevent 3112 it is hired to do, provide shipping document 3114 tointerested parties, and then invoice 3116 the party who contracted forthe shipping event. Then the shipping event is completed, thecontracting party may pay the forwarder, and the forwarder may repay theloan.

In the process where the forwarder wants to setup a loan account from abank, the forwarder may involve the system to assist in providingverification of data and documentation using the trusted storage system.For example, the forwarder 3202 may uses a secure communication 3204system to communicate with a bank 3206 or other financial institution toset up an account 3200, as shown in FIG. 32 . The forwarder 3202 maysend a loan account application and other support documents to the bankvia the secure communication 3204. These documents may includehistorical data on past shipping transactions, safety records, paymenthistory and so on. The documents may be sent between the forwarder 3202and the bank 3206 using secure communication 3204. Secure communicationmay mean messages and attachments are encrypted. Secure communication3204 may also involve secure systems like VPN, encoded communicationchannels and so on.

In this example, the bank 3206 may respond to the forwarder 3202 via thesame secure communication 3204. In some embodiments, the communicationsmay be encrypted. The secure communication 3204 may contain historicaldocuments and a loan application (load account application). Thedocuments and account application may be encrypted, as indicated by thelock and keys. In some embodiments the encryption mechanism may bedifferent between the forwarder and the DCH. Other parties, such as acarrier 3208 and a terminal 3212, may also use the same system 3210. Insome embodiments, the carrier and terminal may be the sources ofshipping documents and shipping events. Since the forwarder may beinvolved in the shipment, the forwarder may get the documents and eventsand provide them to the bank for loan account application.

Other users of the system 3210 may be involved to provide additionaldocumentation. For example, a carrier 3208 may verify that the forwarder3202 is indeed about to engage in a shipping transaction. The carrier3208 may provide such details as how much cargo is to be carried, and towhat destination. The forwarder 3202 may use this data to support howmuch money they need to initiate their loan application.

The bank 3206 may request verification of the documents and send aninquiry to the system 3210. The inquiry may be encrypted and contain ahash. The hash can be identified and compared to the original data usedto generate the hash. Then if everything matches, the system 3210 mayverify the data sent by the bank 3206.

In some embodiments, after forwarder has set up a loan account, theforwarder may submit financing application to bank to borrow money, thebank is to carry out its normal due diligence to determine if theapplication is an acceptable risk, and likely to pay back any moniesloaned to it. For this example, the forwarder may submit a loanapplication 3304 to a bank or other lending institution, as shown inFIG. 33 . The forwarder may collect booking confirmation document fromcarrier and shipment events from terminal as supporting documents forthe loan application 3304. The completion of the shipping event, item3300, or fulfillment of the loan conditions may produce an event thattriggers the repayment of the loan. For example, the arrival of a shipor carrier vehicle in a terminal 3312, and subsequent unloading ofshipping goods, may trigger the sending of various documents 3314. Theshipping event may be reported to the system 3310, then the system maynotify all relevant parties. The carrier 3308 may be informed the vesselhas arrived and been unloaded. The forwarder 3302 may be informed thatthe cargo has reached the port of destination, and that event hastriggered the payment of the loan to the bank within a fixed period oftime. The bank may also receive verification that the forwarder 3302loan is now due, as the shipment has been completed. The system 3310 mayhave various triggers and alerts built into it so at each stage of ashipment, it may receive updates on the shipping process, and sendalerts to all concerned parties of the same.

A sample invoice 3400 is now shown in FIG. 34 .

An example payment 3500 is now shown in FIG. 35 . In this example, aforwarder may select one or more financing options from as many lendinginstitutions as the forwarder may have. The transaction may be handledby the system so long as the various parties are able to receive andtransmit data to and from the system.

In some embodiments, when a container loads on a terminal, terminaloperator may issue a terminal event notification to inform carrier fortracking of shipment milestone. The terminal event notification containslocation of the terminal, event type, date, time, carrier and containernumber, etc. Then the carrier finds the related parties of thiscontainer and informs the parties through encrypted distributed ledger.

The use of independent encryption for each data attribute of a shippingdocument, combined with a one to one relationship of encryption fieldsto encryption keys, allows any number of businesses engaged in a commonenterprise (such as the shipping of intermodal containers or projectcargo) to create a single shipping document laying out all aspects of acargo booking without divulging any confidential information to anyother party engaged in the booking, or in the public at large.

In some embodiments, when a container loads on a terminal, terminaloperator may issue a terminal event notification to inform carrier fortracking of shipment milestone. The terminal event notification containslocation of the terminal, event type, date, time, carrier and containernumber, etc. Then the carrier finds the related parties of thiscontainer and informs the parties through encrypted distributed ledger.

In some embodiments, a carrier may issue invoice(s) to a shipper and/ora consignee when a shipment is loaded. The shipper and/or consignee maythen pay the invoice(s). Then the carrier issues an original bill oflading to the shipper. The consignee may pay the freight to the shipper.Then the shipper may pass the original bill of lading to the consigneeto get the freight. The carrier may verify whether the consignee paidthe invoice(s) if any, the carrier verifies the original bill of ladingfrom consignee and other cargo release procedures. The carrier may usethe encrypted distributed ledger to notify shipper or consignee aboutthe invoice and update the invoice after shipper or consignee have paid.

Non-limiting aspects are now provided:

-   -   1. A method of securing data privacy for a shipping document        shared in a distributed user group, the method comprising:    -   receiving, via a communication network, the shipping document        from a user, the user having an assigned role, wherein the        shipping document comprises a plurality of data attributes;    -   encrypting, via a first encryption logic, the plurality of data        attributes into a like number of encrypted data attributes, the        first encryption logic generating a data encryption key        corresponding to each encrypted data attribute;    -   organizing, via a programming logic, the plurality of encrypted        data attributes into a distributed data ledger, the distributed        data ledger containing at least one encrypted shipping document        from a user;    -   encrypting, via a second encryption logic, the encryption keys        corresponding to the plurality of data attributes, the second        encryption logic using a look up table providing permissions for        one or more users of the distributed data ledger based on the        user's assigned role;    -   and    -   distributing, via the communication network, the distributed        data ledger to the distributed user group;    -   wherein each user has access to a node, the node providing        access to the distributed data ledger; and    -   wherein each user can only decrypt data related to their        assigned role.    -   2. The method of aspect 1, wherein an access policy is used to        determine a plurality of blockchain nodes for writing the        encrypted data.    -   3. The method of aspect 2, wherein the user assigned role is        associated with a member access control policy.    -   4. The method of aspect 1, wherein the assigned role further        comprises, a relationship between shipping parties.    -   5. The method of aspect 1, wherein the distributed data ledger        contains a plurality of encrypted shipping documents from one or        more users.    -   6. The method of aspect 1, wherein the shipping document        supplied by a user includes the user's assigned role.    -   7. The method of aspect 1, wherein the first or second        encrypting logic utilizes an asymmetric cryptography algorithm.    -   8. The method of aspect 1, wherein the communication network        further comprises a secure internet access.    -   9. A communication system for providing parties in a shipment        transaction real time update information on transaction        progress, the system comprising:    -   a portal to access the system via a secure internet access;    -   a database, the database storing system configuration        information, public keys and reference information of shipment        transactions (bookings);    -   a distributed ledger, the distributed ledger having a node for a        user, the distributed ledger containing data relevant to the        user related to the shipment transaction; and    -   a program, the program coordinating the field level encryption        process and distributes the encrypted results to the distributed        ledger;    -   wherein the user is a party of the shipment transaction; and    -   wherein the portal, the database and the distributed ledger are        accessible through a cloud computing environment.    -   10. The communication system of aspect 9, wherein the portal is        a client application.    -   11. The communication system of aspect 9, wherein the        distributed ledger is a hyper ledger.

Referring now to FIG. 36 , depicted is a flow diagram of a method 3600of securely sharing data from multiple sources with different clientterminals. The method 3600 may be implemented or performed using any ofthe components described herein in conjunction with FIG. 1-35 or 37 . Inbrief overview, the method 3600 may include establishing an electronicdocument for transaction (3605). The method 3600 may include identifyingencryption keys (3610). The method 3600 may include distributing theencryption keys (3615). The method 3600 may include providing access(3620).

In further detail, the method 3600 may include establishing anelectronic document for transaction (3605). A server (e.g., a shippingdocument control hub) may identify, create, or establish the electronicdocument (sometimes referred herein as a shipping document). Theelectronic document may define, contain, or include information for asingle transaction through multiple client terminals (or entities). Thesingle transaction may involve a physical good (e.g., delivery from onepoint to another point), and may include a series of sub-transactionsrelated to the physical good. Each sub-transaction of the physical goodmay be handled by at least one service provider (e.g., agent,intermediary). The service provider may operate or be associated with atleast one of the client terminals involved in the transaction. One ofthe service providers may be the one that initiated establishment of theelectronic document, with the remaining service providers accessingand/or contributing to (e.g., updating, or adding information to) theelectronic document after the establishment.

The electronic document may include a set of data fields. Each datafield of the electronic document may be related to or mapped to one ofthe sub-transactions of the single transaction involving the physicalgood. In the electronic document, each data field may be assigned anattribute or a value. The attribute for at least one of the data fieldsmay be associated with (e.g., provided/contributed from, and/or updatedby) one of the client terminals (e.g., user nodes of system 1300)involved in the single transaction. The attribute for at least one ofthe data fields may be from and/or updated by the client terminaloperated by a first entity or first service provider that initiated orcreated the electronic document. The data fields may include parametersdescribing the transaction, such as container size, event date, port oflanding, cargo description, gross weight, vessel name, and loan account,among others. In some embodiments, the electronic document may bemaintained on a database (e.g., the document control hub 3002). Thedatabase may be maintained or belong to a shipping document control hubfor coordinating communications among the client terminals. Each datafield of the electronic document maintained on the database maycorrespond to a database entry on the database.

In some embodiments, in establishing the electronic document, the servermay receive a request to set, assign, or otherwise update an attributeof a data field in the electronic document. The request may be from oneof the client terminals associated with the service provider thatcontributes to the electronic document, subsequent to the initialestablishment by the first entity. The service provider associated withthe request may lack any (or have limited) knowledge or interaction withthe first entity, or any of the other service providers that contributesor provides attributes to the data fields of the electronic document. Inthis manner, the data fields of the electronic document may be filled inan ad hoc manner using information from various entities. Some or allservice providers may be introduced or involved in (e.g.,sub-transactions or parts of) the single transaction, on an ad hocmanner (e.g., as-needed, or proximate to or at the time that a serviceprovider's part in the transaction arises) instead of beingpredetermined, e.g., at the time of establishment of the electronicdocument. Each part or sub-transaction of the transaction may be filledor serviced by one of a plurality of available service providers, whichmay be dynamically matched, filled and/or selected as the transactiondevelops and/or when the need/part/sub-transaction arises). A serviceprovider may have no (or limited) knowledge of the transaction otherthan the part/service and/or service provider(s) that the serviceprovider directly interface with to perform the service provider'spart/service in the transaction. The request may identify the data fieldin the electronic document to be updated and the new attribute to set tothe data field. The server may determine whether the client terminal haspermission to modify the data field in accordance with an access controlpolicy for a role of the client terminal. The access control policy mayspecify which data fields the client terminals (or the correspondingroles) involved in the transaction have permission to access or modify.To determine whether there is permission, the client terminal mayidentify a role of the client terminal in the transaction. The role maybe identified from a role list for the series of sub-transactionsinvolved in the transaction.

When no role (or authorized/valid role) is identified for the clientterminal, the server may determine that the client terminal lackspermission to modify the data field, and may maintain the attribute inthe data field. Otherwise, when the role is identified, the server mayidentify the access control policy for the role. The server maydetermine whether the client terminal has permission based on the accesscontrol policy for the role identified for the client terminal. When theaccess control policy specifies that the client terminal (or the role)lacks permission, the server may determine that the client terminallacks permission. The server may also prevent updating the attribute ofthe data field in the electronic document by the client terminal thatsubmitted the request. Conversely, when the access control policyspecifies that the client terminal (or the role) has permission, theserver may determine that the client terminal has permission to access.The server may permit the client terminal to update the attribute of thedata field in the electronic document. In some embodiments, the servermay identify the attribute from the request and assign the attribute tothe data field.

The method 3600 may include identifying encryption keys (3610). Eachencryption key may be used to encrypt a corresponding data field in theelectronic document. Each encryption key may also be associated with oneof the client terminals that provided the attributed to thecorresponding data field in the electronic document. The encryption keysmay be generated by the server or the corresponding client terminal. Theencryption key may be generated in accordance with asymmetriccryptography, such as public-key cryptography, Diffie-Hellman keyexchange, elliptic curve function, and a RSA cryptosystem, among others.In some embodiments, the encryption keys identified may include a set ofprivate encryption keys and a set of public encryption keys for thecorresponding client terminals. Each private encryption key maycorrespond to one of the data fields and may be associated with one ofthe client terminals that provided the attribute to the data field. Eachpublic encryption key may correspond to one of the data fields and maybe associated with one of the client terminals that provided theattribute to the data field. In some embodiments, the server mayretrieve, collect, or aggregate the encryption keys (e.g., publicencryption keys) from the client terminals involved in the singletransaction. Each encryption key aggregated by the server may begenerated by one of the client terminals that provided the attribute tothe data field in the electronic document. In some embodiments, a newencryption key may be identified for a data field that is updated usingthe attribute from one of the client terminals.

The method 3600 may include distributing the encryption keys (3615). Theserver may provide, deliver, distribute the encryption keys across theclient terminals involved in the single transaction for the electronicdocument in accordance with the access control policy. The accesscontrol policy may specify access permissions (e.g., decrypt, open,write, or edit) for client terminals (or corresponding roles) to eachdata field in the electronic document. The access control policy mayspecify the access permissions based on a role of the individual clientterminal. For each of the data fields in the electronic document, theaccess control policy may indicate at least two client terminals (orcorresponding roles) have access to the data field.

In distributing, the server may provide a corresponding privateencryption key to each of the client terminals involved in the singletransaction. The private encryption key may be used to encrypt ordecrypt the data field provided by the corresponding client terminal. Insome embodiments, the server may identify two or more client terminalsinvolved in the single transaction based on respective roles inaccordance with the access control policy. For example, a first roleassociated with a first client terminal and a second role associatedwith a second client terminal may be specified by the access controlpolicy as having access to one of the data fields in the electronicdocument. The server may encrypt an encryption key (e.g., the privateencryption key) of the first client terminal using another encryptionkey (e.g., the public encryption key) of the second client terminal.Upon encryption, the server may provide the encryption key of firstclient terminal to the second client terminal.

Additionally, the server may provide a public encryption key to one ormore of the client terminals in accordance with the access controlpolicy. For example, the access control policy may specify for one ofthe data fields that two client terminals have permission to access theattribute in the data field. In this example, the server may provide thepublic encryption key to the two client terminals. In this manner, eachof the data fields in the electronic document may be accessible by oneor more of the client terminals using the private encryption key or thepublic encryption key provided to the client terminals.

In some embodiments, the server may determine whether a distribution ofthe encryption keys across the client terminals is successful. Theserver may transmit, send, or provide a message (e.g., an eventnotification) to one or more of the client terminals based on thedetermination. When the determination is that the distribution issuccessful, the server may publish or provide a success code to one ormore of the client terminals, such as the client terminal that sent therequest to update one of the data fields in the electronic document.Conversely, when the determination is that the distribution isunsuccessful, the server may publish or provide an error code to one ormore of the client terminals.

In some embodiments, the server may identify a hash value derived from acorresponding attribute in one of the data fields in the electronicdocument. The hash value may be generated using a hash function, such asa cyclic redundancy check, a checksum, a cryptographic hash function,and a message authentication code, among others. The hash value may begenerated by the client terminal that provided the attribute to the datafield in the electronic document. The hash value may be to ensure dataintegrity of the attribute assigned to the data field in the electronicdocument. The server may also distribute the hash value across theclient terminals in accordance with the access control policy.

In some embodiments, the server may receive or identify a signature foreach client terminal of the client terminals involved in the singletransaction. The signature may be generated by applying the encryptionkey corresponding to the client terminal to the hash value derived fromthe attribute of the data field provided by the client terminal. Thesignature may be generated by the server or the client terminal thatprovided the attribute. The signature may be to ensure data integrity ofthe attribute in the data field in the electronic document.

The method 3600 may include providing access (3620). The server mayprovide access to each client terminal access to one or more of the datafields in the electronic document using the encryption keys distributedin accordance with the access control policy. In some embodiments, theserver may import, provide, generate and/or maintain the attributes ofthe data fields or the electronic document. In some embodiments, theserver may receive a request to access one or more data fields of theelectronic document using an identifier (e.g., a shipping documentidentifier, or booking number, carrier organization) from one of theclient terminals. The server may determine whether the electronicdocument referenced by the identifier exists on the database. When theelectronic document is determined to not exist, the server may return anerror message. Conversely, when the electronic document is determined toexist, the server may continue to verify whether the client terminal hasaccess to the data fields. Each client terminal may be able to accessthe data fields to which the client terminal provided the attributeusing a corresponding encryption key provided to the client terminal. Inaddition, each client terminal may be able to access the data fieldsusing a corresponding encryption key provided to the client terminal asspecified by the access control policy.

In some embodiments, the server may provide access to one of the datafields in the electronic document to two or more client terminalsidentified based on the roles in accordance with the access controlpolicy. Each of the identified clients may have been provided with thehash value and the signature for the data field in the electronicdocument. The hash value may be derived from the attribute in the datafield and the signature may be generated using the hash value and theencryption key (e.g., the public encryption key) of the client terminalthat provided the attribute. Via the hash value and the signature, theother client terminal may obtain the encryption key to access theattribute in the data field. The other client terminal may calculate thehash value from the encrypted attribute, and decrypt the signature usingthe hash value to obtain the decrypted hash value. The client terminalmay then compare the decrypted hash value with the hash value todetermine integrity. When the hash values match, the client terminal maydetermine that the attribute has data integrity. Otherwise, when thehash values do not match, the client terminal may determine that theattribute lacks data integrity.

Referring now to FIG. 37 , computer 3700 may include one or moreprocessors 3705, volatile memory 3710 (e.g., random access memory(RAM)), non-volatile memory 3720 (e.g., one or more hard disk drives(HDDs) or other magnetic or optical storage media, one or more solidstate drives (SSDs) such as a flash drive or other solid state storagemedia, one or more hybrid magnetic and solid state drives, and/or one ormore virtual storage volumes, such as a cloud storage, or a combinationof such physical storage volumes and virtual storage volumes or arraysthereof), user interface (UI) 3725, one or more communicationsinterfaces 3715, and communication bus 3730. User interface 3725 mayinclude graphical user interface (GUI) 3750 (e.g., a touchscreen, adisplay, etc.) and one or more input/output (I/O) devices 3755 (e.g., amouse, a keyboard, a microphone, one or more speakers, one or morecameras, one or more biometric scanners, one or more environmentalsensors, one or more accelerometers, etc.). Non-volatile memory 3720stores operating system 3735, one or more applications 3740, and data3745 such that, for example, computer instructions of operating system3735 and/or applications 3740 are executed by processor(s) 3705 out ofvolatile memory 3710. In some embodiments, volatile memory 3710 mayinclude one or more types of RAM and/or a cache memory that may offer afaster response time than a main memory. Data may be entered using aninput device of GUI 3750 or received from I/O device(s) 3755. Variouselements of computer 3700 may communicate via one or more communicationbuses, shown as communication bus 3730.

Computer 3700 as shown in FIG. 37 is shown merely as an example, asclients, servers, intermediary and other networking devices and may beimplemented by any computing or processing environment and with any typeof machine or set of machines that may have suitable hardware and/orsoftware capable of operating as described herein. Processor(s) 3705 maybe implemented by one or more programmable processors to execute one ormore executable instructions, such as a computer program, to perform thefunctions of the system. As used herein, the term “processor” describescircuitry that performs a function, an operation, or a sequence ofoperations. The function, operation, or sequence of operations may behard coded into the circuitry or soft coded by way of instructions heldin a memory device and executed by the circuitry. A “processor” mayperform the function, operation, or sequence of operations using digitalvalues and/or using analog signals. In some embodiments, the “processor”can be embodied in one or more application specific integrated circuits(ASICs), microprocessors, digital signal processors (DSPs), graphicsprocessing units (GPUs), microcontrollers, field programmable gatearrays (FPGAs), programmable logic arrays (PLAs), multi-core processors,or general-purpose computers with associated memory. The “processor” maybe analog, digital or mixed-signal. In some embodiments, the “processor”may be one or more physical processors or one or more “virtual” (e.g.,remotely located or “cloud”) processors. A processor including multipleprocessor cores and/or multiple processors multiple processors mayprovide functionality for parallel, simultaneous execution ofinstructions or for parallel, simultaneous execution of one instructionon more than one piece of data.

Communications interfaces 3715 may include one or more interfaces toenable computer 3700 to access a computer network such as a Local AreaNetwork (LAN), a Wide Area Network (WAN), a Personal Area Network (PAN),or the Internet through a variety of wired and/or wireless or cellularconnections.

Embodiments of the subject matter and the operations described in thisspecification may be implemented in digital electronic circuitry, or incomputer software, firmware, or hardware, including the structuresdisclosed in this specification and their structural equivalents, or incombinations of one or more of them. Embodiments of the subject matterdescribed in this specification may be implemented as one or morecomputer programs, i.e., one or more modules of computer programinstructions, encoded on one or more computer storage medium forexecution by, or to control the operation of, data processing apparatus,such as a processing circuit. A controller or processing circuit such asCPU may comprise any digital and/or analog circuit components configuredto perform the functions described herein, such as a microprocessor,microcontroller, application-specific integrated circuit, programmablelogic, etc. Alternatively or in addition, the program instructions maybe encoded on an artificially generated propagated signal, e.g., amachine-generated electrical, optical, or electromagnetic signal, thatis generated to encode information for transmission to suitable receiverapparatus for execution by a data processing apparatus.

A computer storage medium may be, or be included in, a computer-readablestorage device, a computer-readable storage substrate, a random orserial access memory array or device, or a combination of one or more ofthem. Moreover, while a computer storage medium is not a propagatedsignal, a computer storage medium may be a source or destination ofcomputer program instructions encoded in an artificially generatedpropagated signal. The computer storage medium may also be, or beincluded in, one or more separate components or media (e.g., multipleCDs, disks, or other storage devices). Accordingly, the computer storagemedium is both tangible and non-transitory.

The operations described in this specification may be implemented asoperations performed by a data processing apparatus on data stored onone or more computer-readable storage devices or received from othersources. The term “data processing apparatus” or “computing device”encompasses all kinds of apparatus, devices, and machines for processingdata, including by way of example a programmable processor, a computer,a system on a chip, or multiple ones, or combinations, of the foregoingThe apparatus may include special purpose logic circuitry, e.g., an FPGA(field programmable gate array) or an ASIC (application specificintegrated circuit). The apparatus may also include, in addition tohardware, code that creates an execution environment for the computerprogram in question, e.g., code that constitutes processor firmware, aprotocol stack, a database management system, an operating system, across-platform runtime environment, a virtual machine, or a combinationof one or more of them. The apparatus and execution environment mayrealize various different computing model infrastructures, such as webservices, distributed computing and grid computing infrastructures.

A computer program (also known as a program, software, softwareapplication, script, or code) may be written in any form of programminglanguage, including compiled or interpreted languages, declarative orprocedural languages, and it may be deployed in any form, including as astandalone program or as a module, component, subroutine, object, orother unit suitable for use in a computing environment. A computerprogram may, but need not, correspond to a file in a file system. Aprogram may be stored in a portion of a file that holds other programsor data (e.g., one or more scripts stored in a markup languagedocument), in a single file dedicated to the program in question, or inmultiple coordinated files (e.g., files that store one or more modules,sub programs, or portions of code). A computer program may be deployedto be executed on one computer or on multiple computers that are locatedat one site or distributed across multiple sites and interconnected by acommunication network.

The processes and logic flows described in this specification may beperformed by one or more programmable processors executing one or morecomputer programs to perform actions by operating on input data andgenerating output. The processes and logic flows may also be performedby, and apparatus may also be implemented as, special purpose logiccircuitry, e.g., an FPGA (field programmable gate array) or an ASIC(application specific integrated circuit).

Processors suitable for the execution of a computer program include, byway of example, both general and special purpose microprocessors, andany one or more processors of any kind of digital computer. Generally, aprocessor will receive instructions and data from a read only memory ora random access memory or both. The essential elements of a computer area processor for performing actions in accordance with instructions andone or more memory devices for storing instructions and data. Generally,a computer will also include, or be operatively coupled to receive datafrom or transfer data to, or both, one or more mass storage devices forstoring data, e.g., magnetic, magneto optical disks, or optical disks.However, a computer need not have such devices. Moreover, a computer maybe embedded in another device, e.g., a mobile telephone, a personaldigital assistant (PDA), a mobile audio or video player, a game console,a Global Positioning System (GPS) receiver, or a portable storage device(e.g., a universal serial bus (USB) flash drive), to name just a few.Devices suitable for storing computer program instructions and datainclude all forms of non-volatile memory, media and memory devices,including by way of example semiconductor memory devices, e.g., EPROM,EEPROM, and flash memory devices; magnetic disks, e.g., internal harddisks or removable disks; magneto optical disks; and CD ROM and DVD-ROMdisks. The processor and the memory may be supplemented by, orincorporated in, special purpose logic circuitry.

To provide for interaction with a user, embodiments of the subjectmatter described in this specification may be implemented on a computerhaving a display device, e.g., a CRT (cathode ray tube) or LCD (liquidcrystal display) monitor, OLED (organic light emitting diode) monitor orother form of display for displaying information to the user and akeyboard and/or a pointing device, e.g., a mouse or a trackball, bywhich the user may provide input to the computer. Other kinds of devicesmay be used to provide for interaction with a user as well; for example,feedback provided to the user may be any form of sensory feedback, e.g.,visual feedback, auditory feedback, or tactile feedback; and input fromthe user may be received in any form, including acoustic, speech, ortactile input. In addition, a computer may interact with a user bysending documents to and receiving documents from a device that is usedby the user; for example, by sending web pages to a web browser on auser's client device in response to requests received from the webbrowser.

While this specification contains many specific embodiment details,these should not be construed as limitations on the scope of anyembodiments or of what may be claimed, but rather as descriptions offeatures specific to particular embodiments. Certain features describedin this specification in the context of separate embodiments can also beimplemented in combination in a single embodiment. Conversely, variousfeatures described in the context of a single embodiment can also beimplemented in multiple embodiments separately or in any suitablesubcombination. Moreover, although features may be described above asacting in certain combinations and even initially claimed as such, oneor more features from a claimed combination can in some cases be excisedfrom the combination, and the claimed combination may be directed to asubcombination or variation of a sub combination.

Similarly, while operations are depicted in the drawings in a particularorder, this should not be understood as requiring that such operationsbe performed in the particular order shown or in sequential order, orthat all illustrated operations be performed, to achieve desirableresults. In certain circumstances, multitasking and parallel processingmay be advantageous. Moreover, the separation of various systemcomponents in the embodiments described above should not be understoodas requiring such separation in all embodiments, and it should beunderstood that the described program components and systems cangenerally be integrated in a single software product or packaged intomultiple software products.

References to “or” may be construed as inclusive so that any termsdescribed using “or” may indicate any of a single, more than one, andall of the described terms.

Thus, particular embodiments of the subject matter have been described.Other embodiments are within the scope of the following claims. In somecases, the actions recited in the claims can be performed in a differentorder and still achieve desirable results. In addition, the processesdepicted in the accompanying figures do not necessarily require theparticular order shown, or sequential order, to achieve desirableresults. In certain embodiments, multitasking and parallel processingmay be advantageous.

Having described certain embodiments of the methods and systems, it willnow become apparent to one of skill in the art that other embodimentsincorporating the concepts may be used. It should be understood that thesystems described above may provide multiple ones of any or each ofthose components and these components may be provided on either astandalone machine or, in some embodiments, on multiple machines in adistributed system. The systems and methods described above may beimplemented as a method, apparatus or article of manufacture usingprogramming and/or engineering techniques to produce software, firmware,hardware, or any combination thereof. In addition, the systems andmethods described above may be provided as one or more computer-readableprograms embodied on or in one or more articles of manufacture. The term“article of manufacture” as used herein is intended to encompass code orlogic accessible from and embedded in one or more computer-readabledevices, firmware, programmable logic, memory devices (e.g., EEPROMs,ROMs, PROMs, RAMs, SRAMs, etc.), hardware (e.g., integrated circuitchip, Field Programmable Gate Array (FPGA), Application SpecificIntegrated Circuit (ASIC), etc.), electronic devices, a computerreadable non-volatile storage unit (e.g., CD-ROM, floppy disk, hard diskdrive, etc.). The article of manufacture may be accessible from a fileserver providing access to the computer-readable programs via a networktransmission line, wireless transmission media, signals propagatingthrough space, radio waves, infrared signals, etc. The article ofmanufacture may be a flash memory card or a magnetic tape. The articleof manufacture includes hardware logic as well as software orprogrammable code embedded in a computer readable medium that isexecuted by a processor. In general, the computer-readable programs maybe implemented in any programming language, such as LISP, PERL, C, C++,C#, PROLOG, or in any byte code language such as JAVA. The softwareprograms may be stored on or in one or more articles of manufacture asobject code.

What is claimed is:
 1. A method of securely sharing data from multiple sources with different client terminals, the method comprising: establishing, by at least one server having one or more processors, a shipping document defining a plurality of data attributes for a plurality of shipment parties, the shipping document having a plurality of data fields, each of the plurality of data fields to be associated with one of a plurality of client terminals each corresponding to one of the plurality of shipment parties; identifying, by the at least one server, at least one encryption key to encrypt the at least one data field from the plurality of data fields included in the shipping document, to form an encrypted data field; distributing, by the at least one server, the at least one encryption key to at least one of the plurality of client terminals in accordance with an access control policy, the access control policy specifying access permissions for a corresponding client terminal of the plurality of client terminals to one or more of the plurality of data fields, according to a shipment role of a corresponding shipment party in the shipping document; and distributing, by the at least one server, to at least one of the plurality of client terminals, the encrypted data field in the shipping document along with the at least one encryption key, in accordance with the access control policy.
 2. The method of claim 1, wherein establishing the shipping document further comprises: receiving, from a first client terminal of the plurality of client terminals, a request to update an attribute of a first data field of the plurality of the data fields in the shipping document; determining, in accordance with the access control policy based on a role of the first client terminal in the booking, that the first client terminal has permission to modify the first data field; and permitting, responsive to determining that the first client terminal has the permission, the client terminal to update the attribute of the first data field in the shared shipping document.
 3. The method of claim 1, wherein identifying the at least one encryption key further comprises identifying, for the plurality of client terminals, a private encryption key and a public encryption key; and wherein distributing the encryption key further comprises: providing the private encryption key to a corresponding client terminal of the plurality of client terminals; and providing the public encryption key to at least one of the plurality of client terminals in accordance with the access control policy, at least one of the plurality of data fields in the electronic document accessible by at least two of the plurality of client terminals using at the private encryption key and the public encryption key.
 4. The method of claim 1, further comprising: identifying, by the at least one server, a plurality of hash values derived from a corresponding plurality of attributes in the plurality of data fields of the shared shipping document, each hash value of the plurality of hash values to ensure data integrity of one of the plurality of attributes; and generating, by the at least one server, for a first client terminal of the plurality of client terminals, a first signature using a first hash value of the plurality of hash values and a first encryption key of the plurality of encryption keys, the first hash value derived from a first attribute of the plurality of attributes, wherein the first encryption key is for a first data field of the plurality of data fields corresponding to the first attribute, the first signature to ensure data integrity of the first attribute and the first data field.
 5. The method of claim 1, further comprising: determining, by the at least one server, whether the at least one of the plurality of encryption keys and at least one of the encrypted data fields are distributed successfully across the plurality of client terminals; and providing, by the at least one server, based on a determination of whether the encryption key and the encrypted data field are distributed successfully, an event notification to at least one of the plurality of client terminals.
 6. The method of claim 1, wherein the shipment of freight is an intermodal container.
 7. A system for securely sharing data from multiple sources with different client terminals, comprising: at least one server having one or more processors configured to: establish a shared shipping document for defining at least one parameter for a shipment of freight, the shared shipping document comprising a series of data entries for a plurality of shipment parties, the shared shipping document having a plurality of data fields, each of the plurality of data fields to be associated with one of a plurality of client terminals each corresponding to one of the plurality of shipment parities; identify a plurality of encryption keys to encrypt the corresponding plurality of data fields included in the shared shipping document; distribute the plurality of encryption keys across the plurality of client terminals in accordance with an access control policy, the access control policy specifying access permissions for a corresponding client terminal of the plurality of client terminals to one or more of the plurality of data fields, according to a shipment role of a corresponding shipment party in the booking; and provide each of the plurality of client terminals with access to at least one of the plurality of data fields in the electronic document via the plurality of encryption keys distributed in accordance with the access control policy.
 8. The system of claim 7, wherein the at least one server is further configured to: receive, from a first client terminal of the plurality of client terminals, a request to update an attribute of a first data field of the plurality of the data fields in the shared shipping document; determine, in accordance with the access control policy based on a role of the first client terminal in the single booking, that the first client terminal has permission to modify the first data field; and permit, responsive to determining that the first client terminal has the permission, the client terminal to update the attribute of the first data field in the electronic document.
 9. The system of claim 7, wherein the at least one server is further configured to identify the at least one encryption key by identifying, for the plurality of client terminals, a private encryption key and a public encryption key; and wherein the at least one server is further configured to distribute the encryption key by: providing the private encryption key to a corresponding client terminal of the plurality of client terminals; and providing the public encryption key to at least one of the plurality of client terminals in accordance with the access control policy, at least one of the plurality of data fields in the electronic document accessible by at least two of the plurality of client terminals using at the private encryption key and the public encryption key.
 10. The system of claim 7, wherein the at least one server is further configured to: identify a plurality of hash values derived from a corresponding plurality of attributes in the plurality of data fields of the shared shipping document, each hash value of the plurality of hash values to ensure data integrity of one of the plurality of attributes; and generate, for a first client terminal of the plurality of client terminals, a first signature using a first hash value of the plurality of hash values and a first encryption key of the plurality of encryption keys, the first hash value derived from a first attribute of the plurality of attributes, wherein the first encryption key is for a first data field of the plurality of data fields corresponding to the first attribute, the first signature to ensure data integrity of the first attribute and the first data field.
 11. The system of claim 7, wherein the at least one server is further configured to: determine whether the at least one of the plurality of encryption keys and at least one of the encrypted data fields are distributed successfully across the plurality of client terminals; and provide, based on a determination of whether the encryption key and the encrypted data field are distributed successfully, an event notification to at least one of the plurality of client terminals.
 12. The system of claim 7, wherein the shipment of freight is an intermodal container.
 13. A non-transitory computer readable medium storing instructions, which when executed by at least one processor, cause the at least one processor to: establish a shared shipping document for defining at least one parameter for a shipment of freight, the shared shipping document comprising a series of data entries for a plurality of shipment parties, the shared shipping document having a plurality of data fields, each of the plurality of data fields to be associated with one of a plurality of client terminals each corresponding to one of the plurality of shipment parities; identify a plurality of encryption keys to encrypt the corresponding plurality of data fields included in the shared shipping document; distribute the plurality of encryption keys across the plurality of client terminals in accordance with an access control policy, the access control policy specifying access permissions for a corresponding client terminal of the plurality of client terminals to one or more of the plurality of data fields, according to a shipment role of a corresponding shipment party in the booking; and provide each of the plurality of client terminals with access to at least one of the plurality of data fields in the electronic document via the plurality of encryption keys distributed in accordance with the access control policy.
 14. The non-transitory computer readable medium of claim 13, wherein the instructions further cause the at least one processor to: receive, from a first client terminal of the plurality of client terminals, a request to update an attribute of a first data field of the plurality of the data fields in the shared shipping document; determine, in accordance with the access control policy based on a role of the first client terminal in the single booking, that the first client terminal has permission to modify the first data field; and permit, responsive to determining that the first client terminal has the permission, the client terminal to update the attribute of the first data field in the electronic document.
 15. The non-transitory computer readable medium of claim 13, wherein the instructions cause the at least one processor to identify the at least one encryption key by identifying, for the plurality of client terminals, a private encryption key and a public encryption key; and wherein the instructions further cause the at least one processor to distribute the encryption key by: providing the private encryption key to a corresponding client terminal of the plurality of client terminals; and providing the public encryption key to at least one of the plurality of client terminals in accordance with the access control policy, at least one of the plurality of data fields in the electronic document accessible by at least two of the plurality of client terminals using at the private encryption key and the public encryption key.
 16. The non-transitory computer readable medium of claim 13, wherein the instructions further cause the at least one processor to: identify a plurality of hash values derived from a corresponding plurality of attributes in the plurality of data fields of the shared shipping document, each hash value of the plurality of hash values to ensure data integrity of one of the plurality of attributes; and generate, for a first client terminal of the plurality of client terminals, a first signature using a first hash value of the plurality of hash values and a first encryption key of the plurality of encryption keys, the first hash value derived from a first attribute of the plurality of attributes, wherein the first encryption key is for a first data field of the plurality of data fields corresponding to the first attribute, the first signature to ensure data integrity of the first attribute and the first data field.
 17. The non-transitory computer readable medium of claim 13, wherein the instructions further cause the at least one processor to: determine whether the at least one of the plurality of encryption keys and at least one of the encrypted data fields are distributed successfully across the plurality of client terminals; and provide, based on a determination of whether the encryption key and the encrypted data field are distributed successfully, an event notification to at least one of the plurality of client terminals.
 18. The non-transitory computer readable medium of claim 13, wherein the shipment of freight is an intermodal container. 